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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, considerable legal scholarship has focused on the
liabilities of corporate boards of directors.1 The composition and procedures of
corporate boards, and innumerable proposals to reform the same, have spawned
other countless books and articles.2 No doubt recent corporate scandals will once
again produce the question “Where were the directors?” and lead to still more
lawsuits against directors, and more calls for reform.3 Yet, given the constant
interest in, and litany of complaints about, corporate boards, perhaps more
scholars should ask why corporation laws in the United States, and, indeed,
around the world, generally call for corporate governance by or under a board of
directors.4 After all, there are other governance models for a business.5
1
E.g., Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton, & Stephen A. Radin, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998); Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1619 (2001); Peter Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and Organization:
The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 179 (2001); Marlene A. O’Connor, How Should
We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors’ Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI’s Principles of
Corporate Governance, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 954 (1993); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate
Director’s Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DePaul L.
Rev. 655 ((1992); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 945 (1990); Lawrence Soderquist, The Proper Standard for Director’s Negligence Liability, 66 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 37 (1990); Bradley & Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate
Governance, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1989); Charles Hanson, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: of the Duty of
Care and the Business Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 Bus. Law. 1237 (1986); __Cohn, Demise of the
Directors’ Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule,
62 Tex. L. Rev. 591 (1983); Alfred F. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors’ Liability for Negligence,
1972 Duke L.J. 895; Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22
Bus. Law. 35 (1966). I confess I have contributed my small share to the literature treating corporate directors
primarily as a target for legal liability. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, CORPORATION LAW ch. 4 (2000);
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion? 67 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 287 (1994).
2
E.g., Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 203-210 (2d ed. 2001);
American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3.02, 3A.01-3A.05 (1994); Melvin A. Eisenberg, THE STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 149-185 (1977); Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000:
Major Changes but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. Corp. L. 349 (1999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921 (1999); Lauri
Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90
Nw. U. L. Rev. 898 (1996); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 649 (1995); American Bar Association, Section on Business Laws, Committee on Corporate Laws,
Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 49 Bus. Law. 1243 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (1991); Arthur J.
Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. Times, Sec. 3, p. 1 (Oct. 29, 1972).
3
E.g., Douglas M. Branson, Enron – When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to
Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 989, 1014-1021 (2003); James D. Cox, Managing and
Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 Vill. L. Rev.
1077 (2003); Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform,
38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 855 (2003); Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe
on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 911, 927-932 (2003); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some
Initial Reflections, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233,__ (2002); Klaus J. Hopt, Modern Company and Capital Market
Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance after Enron, working paper available on the SSRN
database (2002).
4
For a discussion of the leading scholarship addressing this subject, see text accompanying notes __
infra.
5
E.g., Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997) § 401(f);Uniform Partnership Act (1914) §
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This paper seeks to add to the literature on why boards exist. Moreover,
it does so by taking a very different approach in searching for an answer. Instead
of theorizing, this paper examines historical sources in order to look at how and
why an elected board of directors came to be the accepted mode of corporate
governance. The story of how and why corporate boards arose turns out not only
to be interesting in its own right, but it shows that the original purpose for having
boards was quite different from the purposes argued based upon current
economic and organizational theory. This insight, in turn, may help explain the
frustrating dissonance between what corporate law currently expects of boards,
and what boards, in fact, do.
This examination of the historical and political origins of the corporate
board of directors will proceed in four parts. To provide a starting point against
which to address the history of corporate boards, Part II of this paper explores the
current puzzle presented by the board of directors as an institution. The puzzle
arises because of a clash between the model of the corporate board as the
supreme body elected by the shareholders to ensure governance of the company
on the shareholders’ behalf, and the reality of the minor role that corporate
boards actually play in the governance of most companies. With this background
in place, Part III of this paper traces the historical roots of corporate boards. This
will entail a reverse chronological tour all the way back to the antecedents of
today’s corporate board in fourteenth through sixteenth century companies of
English merchants engaged in foreign trade. In Part IV, this paper turns from
when and how corporate boards developed, to address the underlying concepts
and purposes behind the adoption of the antecedents of today’s corporate boards.
This part shows how the antecedents of today’s corporate boards found their
genesis in the political theories and practices of medieval Europe that, although
hardly democratic, often called for the use of collective governance by a body of
representatives. Finally, this paper concludes in Part V with some thoughts as to
what this history tells us about the role and purpose of a corporate board.
Specifically, the historical and political origins of the corporate board suggest
that the current frustration with corporate boards may arise from confusing an
institution of political legitimacy with goals of business efficiency.
II. THE CURRENT PUZZLE OF CORPORATE BOARDS
A. The Board-Centered Model Of Corporate Governance
American corporation statutes provide, with minor variations in
language, that a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of its
board of directors.6 This board-centered model of corporate governance is not
only the universal norm in American corporate law, it is also the prevailing

18(e)(providing for governance of a partnership by all partners in the absence of agreement to the contrary);
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001), Prefatory Note (purpose of the new Uniform Limited Partnership Act
is to provide a form of business for people who want strong central management, strongly entrenched, and
passive investors with little control). See also text accompanying notes __ infra (showing that boards
commonly do not do much to govern corporations anyway).
6
E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.01; Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141(a).
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model of corporate governance around the world.7 Yet, viewed in a literal and
narrow manner, to say that a corporation shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors does not say that much. After all, someone must
manage a corporation. The substance of this model of corporate governance
comes from three underlying concepts. These concepts involve the relationship
of the directors to the shareholders, the relationship of the directors to each other,
and the relationship of the directors to the corporation’s executives.
The first underlying concept of the board-centered model of corporate
governance is that shareholders elect (normally annually) the directors.8 To see
the significance of this concept, one can compare it with other models. Under the
partnership law default rule, the owners of the firm (the partners), simply by
virtue of being owners, manage the partnership.9 By contrast, the corporation’s
owners (the shareholders), by virtue of being shareholders, have no right to
manage the corporation.10 Their only right is to elect directors, and to vote on
matters the directors submit (either under compulsion of statute11 or voluntarily12)
for shareholder approval. Another extremely common governance model in
partnerships, and in other non-corporate forms of business,13 is for an agreement
among the owners to specify who shall be the managers of the business.14 Yet
another scheme would be management by a self-perpetuating oligarchy of
managers.15 The corporate scheme of periodic elections is obviously different, in
theory if not in fact, from contractually designated or self-perpetuating managers.
The second concept underlying the board-centered model of corporate
governance is that a group composed of peers acting together makes the
7
E.g., Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN THE
EUROPE AND THE U.S.A.__ (1988)(use of boards in Europe); Christopher L. Heftel, Survey, Corporate
Governance in Japan: The Position of Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, 5 U. Haw. L. Rev. 135, __
(1983)(requirement for board in Japan); Howard Gensler, Company Formation and Securities Listing in the
People’s Republic of China, 17 Hous. J. Int’l L. 399, __ (1995)(requirement for board in China). An important
caveat to this statement comes from the German two-tier board model under which there is both a supervisory
board and a management board. E.g., Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate
Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 1819, 1823-1826 (1996). For a
discussion of how and why the corporate board of directors spread around the world, see Franklin A. Gevurtz,
The European Origins and Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors 33 Stetson L. Rev. __ (2004).
8
E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.03(c); Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 211(b). An important exception to the worldwide acceptance of this concept is the German invented system of co-determination, under which employees
elect up to half of the corporation’s directors. E.g., Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance:
European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1338, __ (1984).
9
E.g., Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997) § 401(f);Uniform Partnership Act (1914) § 18(e).
10
E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1.3a (2000).
11
See, e.g., M.B.C.A. § 11.04(b)(requiring shareholder approval for a merger); Del. Gen. Corp. Law
§ 251(c)(same).
12
As, for example, when directors submit conflict-of-interest transactions for shareholder approval.
See, e.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.63 (dealing with the impact of shareholder approval of conflict-of-interest transactions);
Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 144(a)(2) (same).
13
And often attempted in derogation of the board-centered model of governance in corporations as
well. See text accompanying notes __ infra.
14
See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, BUSINESS PLANNING 239, 245-246 (discussing and giving
examples of agreements designating managing partners or managers of an LLC). The traditional limited
partnership encompasses this approach as part of its basic governance model. In this model, some owners
(general partners) manage and face unlimited liability, while other owners (limited partners) agree to relinquish
a role in management in exchange for limited liability. E.g., Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1985) § 303(a).
15
Many Dutch corporations follow this sort of pattern (except insofar as qualified by the right of
employees to object to the labor representatives selected by the board). E.g., Jesse H. Choper, John C. Coffee
Jr. & Ronald J. Gilson, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 54 (5th ed. 2000).
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decisions. Again, the significance of this concept becomes clear if one compares
it to other governance schemes. Many businesses have one person who singlehandedly makes at least the ultimate decisions.16 By contrast, the historic rule,
and still prevailing norm, is that corporate boards consist of more than one
director.17 As businesses or other organizations grow, group decision-making
commonly replaces the solitary decision-maker. Nevertheless, this is often a
hierarchical group.18 In such a group, all members might have input, and the
group often strives toward consensus, but, at least as a legal matter, one person
has the ultimate power to make the decision.19 By contrast, the corporate board
norm is that all directors have an equal vote, and majority rule prevails in the
event of differences.20 Another alternative, often employed in conjunction with
hierarchical group decision-making, is to subdivide authority among
individuals.21 By contrast, the longstanding corporate law rule is that directors
lack any authority to act as individual directors; rather, the directors only have
authority when they act as a group through board meetings.22
The third concept embedded in the board-centered model of corporate
governance is that the board has the ultimate responsibility for selecting and
supervising the corporation’s senior executives (especially its chief executive
officer). Actually, corporation statutes often allow, and a rare corporation’s
bylaws might provide, for shareholder election of the corporation’s president or
other senior officers.23 Nevertheless, the overwhelming practice is for the board
to appoint the chief executive officer and other senior corporate officials.24
Moreover, courts have held that arrangements, which deprive boards of the
ultimate power to control officers or other individuals in managing the
corporation, violate the statutory provision commanding that corporations be
managed by or under the direction of the board.25

16

This, of course, is the way a sole proprietorship typically operates.
See, e.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.03 Official Comment 1; Edwin J. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close
Corporation – The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 Geo. L.J. 1145,__ (1966). More recently,
amendments to corporation statutes have allowed single-person boards. E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.03. See also Cal.
Corp. Code § 212(a)(allowing less than three board members if the corporation has less than three
shareholders).
18
E.g., ___.
19
The famous anecdote of President Lincoln and his cabinet provides an illustration. The story goes
that Lincoln put a decision to his cabinet, all of whom voted no. Lincoln voted aye. Lincoln then announced
that the “ayes have it.” E.g., __.
20
See, e.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.24(c).
21
This, in fact, describes the typical corporate management structure below the board level. E.g.,
Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside Directors, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. 5, 9-11
(1989).
22
E.g., Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261 (1879). A minor variation on this rule exists
under common corporate statutes which allow board action through unanimous written consent. E.g., M.B.C.A.
§ 8.21. Also, directors might act through committees. E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.25.
23
See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 142(b) (officers appointed by the board or as provided in the
bylaws). But see M.B.C.A. 8.40(b) (the board appoints officers; albeit officers can appoint other officers if
authorized by the board or bylaws).
24
E.g., Eisenberg, supra note __ at 162-163.
25
E.g., Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633
(1948); Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal.App.2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953). See also Grimes v.
Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (acknowledging the rule, but not finding an impermissible delegation). An
obvious exception to this exists if the statute allows a specific sort of arrangement which deprives the board of
authority. See text accompanying notes ___ infra.
17
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B. Rationalizations For The Board-Centered Model Of Corporate Governance
Most literature dealing with the corporate board of directors takes the
existence of this institution as a given.26 Nevertheless, a number of writers have
suggested various rationales for this governance structure.
1. The Need for Central Management
A simple-minded rationale often expressed for the board-centered model
of corporate governance is that businesses with numerous owners need “central
management.”27 The basic notion is that it is impractical to have numerous
owners – especially if they own freely tradable interests – constantly meet
together to make decisions for the firm. This certainly explains why firms with
numerous owners might not wish to follow the partnership law default rule under
which all owners participate in managing the firm. Indeed, writers typically list
the desirability of central management as one reason why persons establishing a
business anticipated to have numerous owners might prefer to operate through a
corporation rather than a partnership.28 Yet, this rationale fails to justify most of
the concepts that underlie the board-centered model of corporate governance.
The need for central management fails to explain why shareholders
annually should elect the board. As stated above,29 agreements governing many
non-corporate business organizations with numerous owners specify who will be
in charge of the business, rather than providing for periodic elected terms.
Alternately, a self-perpetuating oligarchy would provide for central management.
More fundamentally, the need for central management does not explain why this
management should take the form of a group acting together as peers. A sole
decision-maker would provide central management. More realistically in a large
business, why not provide for decision-making through a hierarchy leading to a
chief executive officer?
2. Group Decision-making
A recent article by Stephen Bainbridge30 moves beyond the need for
central management in asking why corporate law calls for a board, rather than
just a chief executive officer, to be at the apex of the corporation’s management.
He points to behavioral psychology studies which suggest that groups, such as
corporate boards, often produce better decisions than can single individuals when
it comes to matters of judgment.31

26

See notes 1 through 3 supra. But see Robert A. Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of
Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 696 (1960)(questioning the need for a board of
directors in all corporations).
27
E.g., Robert Clark, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2.4 (1987).
28
E.g., Thomas L. Hazen, The Decision to Incorporate, 58 Neb. L.Rev. 627, __ (1979).
29
See text accompanying note __ supra.
30
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55
Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
31
The notion that groups might reach better decisions than individuals is hardly new or unique to
corporate law scholarship. Proponents of the jury system often point to this rationale. E.g., Micheal J. Saks,
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Presumably, it was not Professor Bainbridge’s intent to justify all aspects
of the board-centered model of corporate governance in pointing to better
decisions from groups versus individuals. For example, he does not explain why
shareholders annually should elect the group (as opposed to some agreed
designation of the managing group or the use of a self-perpetuating oligarchy).
Even as to the central thesis, however, the question remains whether the evidence
Professor Bainbridge cites is sufficient to establish that peer group decisionmaking, as contemplated by the board-centered model of corporate governance,
is superior to hierarchical group decision-making. In other words, while the
multiple input found in groups often leads to superior decisions than made by a
single individual, it is less clear from experimental studies of group decisionmaking whether this requires the group to act as peers, with disagreements
ultimately resolved by majority rule, rather than as a “cabinet” to a single person
who has the final say. This is not an abstract quibble, since most observers of the
large corporation assert that the predominant decision-making mode, in reality, is
hierarchical group decision-making.32 Indeed, even the sort of fundamental
strategic decisions normally thought of as within the board’s purview, in fact,
typically are made by a group consisting of the chief executive officer and the
senior executives in charge of the major divisions or responsible for key
functions.33 To the extent directors, as such, provide input for such decisions,
this commonly occurs through informal conversations with a few more
influential members of the board, rather than at a board meeting.34 Later, this
paper shall address why, in a publicly held corporation, hierarchical group
decision-making tends to replace peer group decision-making regardless of
existence of a corporate board – thereby rendering this attempt to justify boards
rather theoretical.35
3. Representation of Corporate Constituents and Mediating Claims to
Distributions
Yet a different explanation for the use of corporate boards focuses on the
need to mediate the competing claims of those who have an interest in
distributions from the corporation. Proponents of this explanation vary in terms
of which claimants the board exists to mediate between, and whether the need for
a board arises from the desirability of the various claimants having representation
on the decision making body, or the need for a decision making body to be
independent from the various claimants.
Probably the most traditional variation of this rationale suggests that

Book Review: Blaming the Jury (review of JUDGING THE JURY by Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar) 75 Geo.
L.J. 693, 706-707 (1986).
32
E.g., Eisenberg, supra note __ at 140-141.
33
E.g., Interview with John Scriven, former General Counsel of Dow Chemical Corporation
(October 8, 2002).
34
E.g., Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention: Time
for Reality, 39 Bus. Law. 1477, __ (1984).
35
See text accompanying notes __ infra.
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boards exist so that large shareholders36 can elect themselves or their nominees as
directors in order to protect their interests in distributions. Empirical support for
this variation purportedly arises out of a recent study conducted by Morten
Bennedsen of Denmark.37 Professor Bennedsen attempted to look at the motives
for using boards of directors by studying a large sample of Danish firms formed
as anpartsselskaber (an “AN”). The Danes modeled this business form on the
German GmbH.38 Danish law does not require ANs to possess a board of
directors, but, nevertheless, Professor Bennedsen’s study of such firms found that
a little less than one-fifth of his sample used a board governance structure,
including more than half of the firms with three to five owners, and two-thirds of
the firms with more than five owners. Based upon highly indirect statistical
evidence,39 Professor Bennedsen argues that a motive for using boards in the
closely held companies he studied was to protect non-controlling shareholders
from exploitation by controlling shareholders, particularly in regard to
distributions from the company.
It is impossible to assess Professor Bennedsen’s study without much
more information about the specific control arrangements in the firms he studied.
It is true that boards provide a means by which non-controlling owners might
obtain some say in firm management, including regarding corporate distributions.
Nevertheless, the traditional wisdom from the experience of closely held
corporations in the United States is that the board-centered model of corporate
governance is far more likely to allow controlling shareholders to exploit noncontrolling shareholders, than are other modes of management, such as provided
by the partnership default rules, or might be found in a well-drafted shareholders
agreement.40 Consider, for example, the impact of the underlying concept of the
board-centered model of corporate governance that the shareholders periodically
elect the directors. This has been a recipe for controlling shareholders to bounce
non-controlling shareholders off of the board of closely held corporations
whenever controlling shareholders feel like squeezing non-controlling
shareholders out of any say in corporate governance.41 Of course, there are
mechanisms, to which all parties can agree before any dissension, for ensuring
non-controlling shareholders remain on the board.42 By comparison, however,
even without special preplanning, partnership law ensures all owners a say in
management, since (barring other agreement) partners, simply by virtue of being
36

A shareholder with only a small percentage of the outstanding stock lacks the power, even with
techniques such as cumulative voting, to elect oneself or one’s nominee to a corporate board. E.g., Gevurtz,
supra note __ at § 5.2.1a
37
Morten Bennedsen, Why Do Firms Have Boards? working paper available on the SSRN database
(March 2002).
38
Id at 5. “GmbH” is short for Gesellschaft mit beschrantkter Haftung, which means company with
limited liability. The basic idea is to allow limited liability, but without all the requirements imposed on
publicly held corporations. E.g., Henry P. deVries & Friedrch K. Juenger, Limited Liability Contract: The
GmbH, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 866, 867-868 (1964).
39
Professor Bennedsen draws inferences regarding the probable motives for use of boards from
certain statistical correlations (as, for example, the relationship between the dispersion of stock and the use of a
board). The validity of these inferences is well beyond the scope of this paper.
40
See, e.g, F. Hodge O’Neal & Robert Thompson, O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS § 2.10 (2d ed. 1985).
41
See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976)(but
holding the majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder).
42
E.g. Gevurtz, supra note ___ at 477-491.
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partners, are entitled to participate in managing a partnership.43 Moreover, even
if non-controlling shareholders remain on the board, the underlying concept that
corporate boards act by majority rule (as opposed to following an advance
agreement, as in a partnership contract) serves to allow the majority shareholders
in a closely held corporation to gain disproportionate distributions at the expense
of non-controlling shareholders.44 Again, there are agreements that shareholders
can make before dissension, through which minority shareholders can protect
their rights to distributions from the corporation.45 Yet, such agreements act in
derogation of the concept that the board, acting through majority rule, manages
the corporation. Indeed, in earlier years, courts often struck down such
agreements for this reason.46 By contrast, the laws governing partnerships and
other non-corporate business forms, not only contemplate, but encourage,
agreements with respect to distributions and the like.47
A broader variation of this sort of rationale asserts that boards exist to
mediate claims not just among shareholders, but also between shareholders and
other corporate constituencies, such as managers, other employees, creditors, and
perhaps even the community at large. While strains of this notion go back in the
United States at least to the famous Berle-Dobbs debate in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review,48 a recent article by Lynn Stout49 attempts to find
empirical evidence that shareholders grant power to the board for this reason. In
this modern iteration, the argument is that various groups – equity investors,
lenders, managers, other employees, and the like – all make contributions
necessary to corporate revenues, and all expect some distribution from those
revenues. Indeterminacy in the ultimate value of all these contributions toward
producing revenue makes it extraordinarily difficult to come up with ex ante
contracts that will adequately compensate, but not over compensate, each
claimant. This, in turn, suggests the need for a mediating body with the power to
make ex post decisions about distributions. Professor Stout argues that
shareholder acquiescence in devices, such as poison pills, that insulate boards
from shareholder control evidence that shareholders themselves have concluded
that boards exist for this purpose.
The question of whether directors should have either a duty or a right to
look out for the interests of contributors to the corporate enterprise other than the
shareholders (except insofar as doing so advances the interests of the
43

See text accompanying note __ supra.
See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975) (but holding
the majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder).
45
E.g., Gevurtz, supra note __ at 499-505.
46
E.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934). As discussed later in this paper,
corporate law now generally allows such agreements. See text accompanying notes __ infra.
47
See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-outs and Freeze-outs in Limited Liability Companies, 72
Wash. U.L.Q. 497, 504-505, 508-509 (1995). This discussion suggests that majority or controlling shareholders
might actually prefer board governance. Yet, if the majority or controlling shareholders desire to cut off the
minority from either distributions or a voice in running the business, a system under which owners, by majority
vote, dictate distributions and elect senior officers to run the corporation (as in Wilkes, supra note __) would
accomplish the majority or controlling shareholders’ objective even without a board.
48
E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932);
A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1932).
49
Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public
Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, working paper available on the SSRN database (November 13,
2003).
44

9

Franklin A. Gevurtz

shareholders) has been a subject of considerable legal and economic policy
debate.50 This article is not the occasion to replay the various arguments.51 For
present purposes, it is sufficient to ask whether the rationale that the board exists
in order to mediate between corporate constituents explains all of the attributes of
the board-centered model of corporate governance. It would if boards were
composed of representatives of the various constituents. In that event, one could
understand why there should be an elected group at the apex of corporate
management. Hence, this rationale seems to explain the existence of the
supervisory board with some representatives elected by the shareholders and
other representatives elected by the workers under the German system of codetermination.52 Yet, for the United States, and most of the world, the boardcentered model of corporate governance assumes a board elected by the
shareholders.53 If the board is not to have elected representatives of each of the
constituencies, what is the point of having a board? Professor Stout’s answer is
to view the board as an independent, rather than a representative, body; perhaps
in the nature of a neutral arbiter. Still, the norm that shareholders elect the
directors seems inconsistent with this rationale. After all, it is difficult to
imagine that various corporate constituencies would have designed a system in
which one body of claimants has the legal right to select whomever it desires to
act as arbiter of distributions between the claimants.54
4. Monitoring of Management
The final rationale for the board-centered model of corporate governance
represents the prevailing view. This rationale is that boards elected by
shareholders exist as a necessary tool to monitor corporate management.55
Typically, this view starts with the assumption that corporate hierarchy exists to
gain the advantage of team production, while minimizing agency costs (shirking
and disloyalty) by having higher-level agents monitor lower-level agents.56 The
50
E.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991); American Bar Association
Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. Law. 2253
(1990); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 121 (1991).
51
For the author’s view, see Gevurtz, supra note __ at § 4.1.5.
52
In fact, constituent representation was the reason for the German adoption of the supervisory
board. E.g., Klaus J. Hopt, __.
53
See note __ supra.
54
Professor Stout points out that collective action problems effectively blunt shareholder control
over the composition of the board in public corporations. Instead, as discussed below, management
traditionally has had control over the proxy machinery and chosen the directors. See text accompanying notes
__ infra. Yet, this still does not show that boards can act as independent arbiters; even if boards in public
corporations may be more likely to favor senior management as opposed to the shareholders. Moreover, the
fortuitous happenstance that collective action problems undercut the norm of shareholder selection of directors
applies only to public corporations without a controlling shareholder (or controlling shareholder group). Hence,
Professor Stout fails to explain the existence of boards in corporations other than publicly held corporations
without controlling shareholder(s). More significantly, the fact that controlling shareholders dictate the
composition of the boards in most corporations fundamentally undercuts Professor Stout’s rationalization for
boards even in public companies, since it shows that firms can and do overcome the ex ante contracting
problems between different contributors without an independent mediating body.
55
E.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note __ at § 3.02; Eisenberg, supra
note __ at 169-170.
56
E.g., Bainbridge, supra note __ at 5-7.
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problem becomes, however, who monitors the highest level monitors. The
traditional economics answer is that the shareholders, as the residual claimants,
have the best incentives to monitor the highest-level agents.57 This answer,
however, faces a practical difficulty in the publicly held corporation, since there
are too many scattered shareholders to allow for efficient monitoring directly by
the shareholders. This, in turn, leads to the argument that the corporate board,
elected by the shareholders, provides a solution to the practical difficulty of
shareholders monitoring on their own behalf.58
The monitoring rationale provides an elegant answer to why the
shareholders should elect the board and why the board should appoint the senior
executives. Interestingly, however, the rationale does not explain the need for a
board, so long as the shareholders elect whoever stands at the apex of corporate
management. In other words, one might achieve the same monitoring effect by
having the shareholders elect the corporation’s chief executive officer. Yet, there
is an even more fundamental problem with the monitoring of management
rationale for the board-centered model of corporate governance. The monitoring
rationale rests upon a rather curious assumption. The assumption is that
shareholders, who are too numerous and disengaged to monitor management on
their own behalf, will become sufficiently engaged and organized to select
vigilant directors to perform the monitoring for the shareholders.
C. The Board-Centered Model Of Corporate Governance Meets Reality
The reality of corporate governance differs in subtle, but important, ways
from a model that posits that shareholders select directors, who select and
supervise senior officers, who, in turn, carry out the board’s will. The nature of
this difference depends upon whether one is dealing with a corporation with very
few shareholders (a closely held corporation) or a corporation with very many
shareholders (a publicly held corporation).
1. Closely Held Corporations
In the closely held corporation, reality diverges from the board-centered
model of corporate governance because the shareholders, directors and officers
are the same people.59 In other words, instead of having a large group of passive
shareholders elect directors (who may or may not be shareholders) to manage the
company, in a corporation with few shareholders, all or most of those
shareholders will elect themselves as the directors of the company. Similarly,
instead of having the board select officers who may or may not be directors and
shareholders, in the closely held corporation, the shareholder-directors typically
also will select themselves to be the officers. Under these circumstances, the
shareholders often simply view themselves as running the business as owners –
57
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 783 (1972).
58
E.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
Econ. 301, 311 (1983).
59
E.g., F. Hodge O’Neal & Robert Thompson, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07 (3d
ed. 1988).
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much as partners operate. As a result, having a board serves little evident
purpose.
The reaction of corporate law to the divergence between the boardcentered model of corporate governance and the realities of practice in the
closely held corporation increasingly has been to give up on any attempt to
preserve the board-centered model of corporate governance as anything other
than a default rule. This is most evident in statutes that allow shareholders in
close corporations to dispense with the board.60 Even without dispensing with
the board altogether, modern corporation statutes commonly allow shareholders
to make agreements which dictate who will be directors and what decisions the
directors shall make.61
2. Publicly Held Corporations
The divergence between the board-centered model of corporate
governance and reality in a publicly held corporation does not involve the
melding of shareholders, directors and officers into the same few people, but,
instead, involves the flow of power between these three groups. Specifically, the
board-centered model of corporate governance perceives power to flow from
shareholders, who decide who will be the directors, to the directors, who select
the corporate officers and set policy, to the officers. In large measure, the reality
in the publicly held corporation has been almost the reverse. The officers,
particularly the chief executive officer, commonly have decided who will be the
directors and what policies the corporation will pursue.62 To understand why this
inversion has taken place, we need to examine the incentives which impact
decision making at the shareholder level and at the director level.
Shareholders in the publicly held corporation typically are “rationally
apathetic;” in other words, the rational shareholder in a publicly held corporation
normally will conclude that it is not worthwhile to spend much time or effort
worrying about control over the corporation.63 After all, the cost of trying to
change corporate management is quite high – since the dissatisfied shareholder
must seek support from numerous scattered other shareholders – while the
rewards are relatively low, since the other shareholders will reap most of the
gains. In economics lingo, there is a huge “free rider” problem. Of course, one
might respond that the same problem exists when dealing with federal, state and
local government elections. A significant difference, however, exists between
the options open to dissatisfied shareholders and the options open to dissatisfied
citizens. The shareholder who is displeased with management in a publicly held
corporation can quickly and easily sell his or her shares. This self-help remedy
of selling out is often referred to as following the “Wall Street rule.” It is much
less practical for the dissatisfied citizen to pack up and move out of the
jurisdiction.
60

E.g., M.B.C.A. § 7.32(a)(1); Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 351 (for statutory close corporations).
E.g., M.B.C.A. § 7.32(a); Del. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 218(c) (validating agreements regarding who
shareholders will vote for as directors), 350 (validating agreements dictating actions of the board of a statutory
close corporation).
62
E.g., James D. Cox, Thomas L. Hazen & F. Hodge O’Neal, CORPORATIONS § 9.2 (1997).
63
E.g., Choper, Coffee & Gilson, supra note __ at 544.
61
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Compounding the rational apathy phenomenon is the incumbent
directors’ control over the corporate proxy machinery. Almost invariably, the
corporation will pay for the incumbent directors’ (or their nominees’) solicitation
of proxies.64 This is certainly the case if the election is uncontested, and
normally is the case even in a contested election. By contrast, challengers will
need to foot their own solicitation expenses unless (at the very least) they win.65
This imbalance creates a significant financial disincentive for anyone to
challenge the incumbent board. The end result is that, unlike federal, state and
local government elections, elections of corporate directors rarely are contested.66
The observation that shareholders in publicly held corporations do not
really control the corporation by selecting the directors is known as the “BerleMeans thesis” after the two professors who wrote a book in 1932 that recognized
this phenomenon.67 The discussion so far, however, only explains why
shareholders do not control the composition of the board; it does not explain why
the officers do. Nor have we explained why officers, rather than directors,
control corporate decisions.
To understand why officers, rather than directors, control the public
corporation, it useful to divide directors into two types: “inside” directors and
“outside” directors. “Inside” directors refers to directors who also work full time
for the corporation, in other words, directors who are also officers. “Outside”
directors refers to directors who are not full time employees of the corporation.
A number of practical constraints traditionally have operated to curb the
control that outside directors can exercise over the corporation. Some of these
constraints are obvious. For example, outside directors have limited time to
devote to the corporation. After all, these are individuals who, by definition,
might have full time employment somewhere else.68 Closely related to the lack
of time is the quality of information available to the outside directors in making
corporate decisions. As a practical matter, the outside directors must rely on
information presented to them by the corporation’s officers when making
decisions.69 True, directors have a legal right to inspect corporate records.70 Yet,
time constraints generally render this right more theoretical than actual. Given
these constraints of time and information, the board hardly can initiate much of
any corporate strategy or decisions. Instead, the board’s role largely falls to
approval of such strategies and decisions as officers bring before the board.71
Even in the context of approving strategies and decisions made by the
corporation’s officers, however, the board’s effective control tends to be
64

E.g., Gevurtz, supra note__ at § 3.1b.
See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
66
E.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 336 (8th ed. 2000)(citing SEC and Georgeson & Co. data).
67
Adolph Berle & Gardner Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
68
Among the sorts of individuals who commonly serve as outside directors on corporate boards are
chief executive officers of other companies, bankers and lawyers. E.g, William A Klein & John C. Coffee, Jr.,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 131 (8th ed. 2002).
Even academics and former government officials who sometimes sit on boards have other things to do.
69
E.g., Eisenberg, supra note __ at 204.
70
E.g., M.B.C.A. § 16.05(a).
71
E.g., Manning, supra note __ at __.
65
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marginal. This is so not only because most corporate decisions never come
before the board, but also because a number of factors make it a rare case in
which a board will veto an action proposed by the officers. A couple of these
factors we have just seen: Lack of time and lack of independent information
make it difficult for outside directors to second guess the corporation’s officers.
In addition, there are various biases that work against the outside directors
second-guessing the corporation’s officers. For example, outside directors might
have relationships with the corporation or its officers that would make outside
directors think twice about challenging the officers.72 Most fundamentally,
however, inside directors, and particularly the chief executive officer, have
controlled the corporate proxy machinery and decided who sat on the board.73
This may simply be the consequence of the normal tendency of those with the
greater stake – in this event, the insiders whose jobs are on the line – to be more
assertive in exercising control over the key levers of power. At any event, if the
officers, especially the chief executive officer, pick directors, the normal human
instinct will be to select directors who are likely to defer to the officers.74
What about the inside directors? Since they work full time for the
corporation, presumably they do not face the same time or information
constraints as the outside directors. Yet, in evaluating the ability of the inside
directors to manage the corporation in their role as directors, we must take
cognizance of the two inconsistent realms in which the inside directors operate.
As board members, the inside directors operate in what is supposed to be a
collegial decision making process among equals, with differences resolved, if
necessary, by majority vote.75 As officers, however, the inside directors operate
in a hierarchical setting in which the chief executive officer has the last word.
Moreover, the chief executive officer traditionally has dictated the junior
officers’ prospects for retention and promotion.76 Ultimately, it is probably too
much to expect that directors who are subordinate to the chief executive officer
all but a few days per year are suddenly going to switch gears and second guess
the chief executive officer at the board meeting. Instead, while subordinate
officers of the corporation may have a significant voice in developing policy –
indeed, effective chief executive officers often work by seeking consensus,77 and
much corporate policy originates within the various divisions78 – the input of
inside directors comes in their role as officers rather than co-equal board
members.79
All told, the result has been to reduce the board of directors to an
institution which, despite it formal role as the supreme governing body of the
72
The board of directors at Enron provided a good illustration of this problem. E.g., Gordon, supra
note __ at __.
73
E.g., James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zapac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power,
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 Admin. Sci. Q. 60, 78 (1995).
74
E.g., Myles Mace, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY __ (1971).
75
See text accompanying note __ supra.
76
E.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461, __
(1989).
77
E.g., Scriven, supra note__.
78
This is particularly the case in the “M-form” management structure. E.g., Oliver Williamson,
Organizational Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 351, 366 (1983).
79
E.g., Mace, supra note __ at 119-120.
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corporation, in fact, does very little.80 This dissonance between the expected role
for the board, and the realities of corporate governance, appears to be inherent in
the nature of the institution. One piece of evidence for this conclusion comes
from the fact that complaints about director inaction go back through the history
of corporate boards; appearing in sources ranging from classic articles of legal
scholarship,81 to nineteenth century literature.82 Nor are such complaints limited
to boards in the United States.83 Moreover, despite claims of improvements in
corporate board governance, recent scandals again have produced complaints
about passive boards.84 Of course, the fact that large corporations have
prospered, and have contributed to modern economic prosperity, suggests that
there must be something right about the management structure of corporations –
notwithstanding complaints arising from periodic corporate meltdowns. Still, it
is difficult to read the work of economic historians without coming to the
conclusion that the managerial developments which made corporations work are
those – like the development of the U-form and M-form organizational structure
– that occurred below the level of the board of directors.85
80
E.g.,Monks & Minow, supra note __ at 209 (“The primary conclusion of this chapter is that
America’s boards of directors have, more often than not, failed to protect shareholders’ interests); Rita Komik,
Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance, 32 Admin. Sci. Q. 163, 166-167 (1987)
(modern board is a “co-opted appendage institution”); Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality – Ten Years
Later, 32 Rut. L. Rev. 293 (1979) (study reaffirmed results of earlier study as to director passivity); Mace,
supra note __ at 107 (study finding that directors rarely challenged or monitored CEO performance, but often
served as little more than “attractive ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree”); Robert A. Gordon,
BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 143 (1966) (the board of directors in the typical
large corporation does not actively exercise an important part in the leadership function).
81
E.g., William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305 (1934) (pointing
out in 1934 that a popular theme had become that directors should assume the responsibility of directing).
82
E.g., Anthony Trollope, THE WAY WE LIVE NOW 298-309 (1875) (“Melmotte [the chief
executive officer of the company, and perpetrator of a fraudulent promotion,] would speak a few slow words . . .
always indicative of triumph, and then everybody would agree to everything, somebody would sign something,
and the board . . . would be over”).
83
E.g., Oxford Analytica Ltd, BOARD DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
TRENDS IN G7 COUNTRIES OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS (1992), reprinted in Monks & Minow, supra
note __ at 267 (in Japan, formal authority is held by the company president and the board of directors, but board
meetings are infrequent and decisions are rubber stamped; real authority is held by the president and the
operating committee composed of the president’s immediate subordinates); Monks & Minow, supra note __ at
292 (the president director-general (PDG) of French companies wields almost unchecked control over the
enterprise without the counter power of the board, whose composition and agenda the PDG controls; indeed, it
is regarded as bad manners for the board to vote on a management decision); Mark J. Roe, Political
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539, 568 (2000) (German corporate
supervisory boards meet infrequently and their information has been weak).
84
E.g., The Way We Govern Now, The Economist 59 (Jan. 11, 2003) (discussion of poor board
governance in light of corporate scandals involving Enron); Michael C. Jensen & Joseph Fuller, What’s A
Director To Do? avail. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=357722 (Oct. 2002) (“The recent wave of corporate
scandals provides continuing evidence that boards have failed to fulfill their role as the top-level corporate
control mechanism”); Gordon, supra note __ at __ (Enron’s board was a splendid board on paper, and its failure
reveals a certain weakness with the board as a governance mechanism).
85
E.g., Richard S. Tedlow, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 13-24,
56-60 (19__). While the universal adoption of board governance for public corporations makes it difficult to
perform an empirical study on the impact of proceeding without a board, various recent studies attempt to assess
the impact of board composition and other corporate governance practices on corporate performance. Much of
the results have been inconclusive. E.g., Hamilton, supra, note __ at 359-373 (studies have not produced
consistent positive results from changes in corporate governance, such as increased use of independent
directors); Bhagat & Black, supra, note __ (reviewing over 100 studies and finding no convincing evidence that
independent directors improve firm performance). Studies in less developed economies suggest perhaps a
greater impact. Mark Mobius, Issues in Global Corporate Governance in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN
ASIA-PACIFIC CRITIQUE 47-48 (Low Chee Keong ed. 2002) (recent studies in emerging markets show
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III. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CORPORATE BOARDS
Given the dissonance between the norm that corporations are supposed to
be managed by, or under the direction of, an elected board, and the realities of
corporate governance, it is fair to ask when and how the norm of board
governance developed. With the readers’ indulgence, this section will not
address this subject by using the traditional forward narrative of a history book.
Instead, it will trace the roots of corporate boards in the manner in which the
researcher discovers such things – which is to begin with the more recent and
work one’s way backwards in time until one cannot find earlier examples of the
use of corporate boards. In other words, we will follow the method of an
archeological dig.
A. American Corporate Legislation
The norm that the ultimate power over corporate management resides in
an elected board has always existed in American corporation statutes. The law
commonly considered to be the first general incorporation statute, New York’s
1811 act,86 provided that “the stock, property and concerns of such companys
[sic] shall be managed and conducted by trustees, who, except for the first year,
shall be elected at such time and place as shall be directed by the by laws of said
company . . ..”87 Of course, current corporate statutes typically refer to
“directors,” rather than “trustees,”88 attempt to recognize reality by calling for
corporate management “by or under the direction of” the board, rather than “by”
the board,89 and specify annual election by shareholders, rather than leave this to
the bylaws.90 Still, New York’s statute shows that the basic norm of corporate
board governance existed from the beginning of general incorporation laws.
The New York legislature was not being particularly creative in
providing for board governance in 1811. In fact, this provision seems simply to
have codified the common governance pattern established under the individual
legislatively granted charters through which corporations had previously come

better stock performance of companies with so-called better corporate governance, including more independent
boards). Nevertheless, it is difficult to say how much of this result comes from having a board versus from
other so-called good corporate governance practices, and also how much of improved market returns reflects a
current desire by investors for stock of companies with so-called better corporate governance practices, and how
much reflects actual improved performance by such corporations.
86
Before New York’s statute, a couple of states had enacted narrow corporations laws addressing
turnpikes or the like. E.g., Harry C. Henn & John R. Alexander, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 12 (3d ed.
1983). For the most part, however, prior to this time, corporations came into existence by special legislation,
which granted charters to individual corporations. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note __ at § 1.1.3a.
87
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1811, ch. LXVII.
88
E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.01; Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141(a). Some types of corporations, such as mutual
associations, however, often still use the term trustee. E.g., Mich. Compiled Laws Anno. § 500.6834.
89
E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.01(b); Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141(a). The purpose of the “under the direction
of” language is to make it clear that the statute does not command the board to engage in day-to-day running of
the corporation. E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.01(b) Official Comment.
90
E.g., M.B.C.A. § 8.03(c); Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 211(b).
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into existence.91 Take, for example, the 1791 charter of the Bank of the United
States (often known as the first Bank of the United States92). This charter
provided for a board of 25 directors to be elected annually by the shareholders.93
The bank’s board, in turn, under the charter, annually appointed one of its
members to be the bank’s president, and could appoint such other officers as the
board deemed necessary.94 This governance structure was not unique to banking.
As an illustration, look at The Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures,
which received its charter from the New Jersey legislature in 1791. Alexander
Hamilton (who also had a hand in the formation of the first Bank of the United
States the same year) formed this nobly named corporation to produce paper, sail
linens, women’s shoes, brass and ironware, carpets, and printed cloth. The
affairs of this corporation were under the management of 13 directors elected by
the shareholders. Interestingly enough, the collapse of this corporation provides
an early American example of the failure of outside directors to monitor
management.95
B. English Antecedents
1. The Bank of England
Not surprisingly, the use of boards of directors by the early American
corporations finds its apparent roots in similar provisions of English corporate
charters. The 1694 charter of the Bank of England provides one of the clearest
examples of English influence on American practice. The Bank of England’s
1694 charter provided for a board of twenty-four directors.96 Indeed, this charter
seems to have pioneered the term “director.”97 A “court of proprietors” (what we
would now refer to as a shareholders meeting) annually elected the Bank of
England’s directors.98 Several facts show the influence of this charter on
American practice. An obvious fact is the borrowing of the term “director.”
Another fact is the similarity in the size of the Bank of England’s twenty-fourperson board and the first Bank of the United States’ twenty-five-person board
(which appears simply to have added one to the size of the English bank’s board
in order to avoid tie votes). Finally, in a provision which demonstrates influence
because of its unusual nature, both the Bank of England and the first Bank of the
91

This pattern of governance continued to be found in the special charters granted corporations even
after general incorporation laws first became available. E.g., Joseph K. Angell & Samuel Ames, TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 121 (1832).
92
The charter of the first Bank of the United States expired in 1811. A charter created the second
Bank of the United States in 1816. E.g., Michael P. Malloy, BANK REGULATION § 1.3 (1999).
93
Bank Act [S-15] (Feb. 25, 1791) § 4.
94
Id at §§ 4, 6.
95
E.g., Stanley C. Vance, CORPORATE LEADERSHIP: BOARDS, DIRECTORS, AND
STRATEGY 3-5 (19__).
96
E.g., Cyril O’Donnell, Origins of the Corporate Executive, __ Bull. of the Bus. Hist. Soc. 55, 61
(1952).
97
E.g., Ronald R. Formoy, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COMPANY LAW
21 (1923). While the 1618 charter of the Africa Company called for a board of twelve “directors,” this
terminology for board members did not catch on until the 1694 charter of the Bank of England. E.g., William
R. Scott, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK
COMPANIES TO 1720, vol. I, p. 151-152, 205 (1912)
98
E.g., O’Donnell, supra note__.
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United States imposed term limits on directors: The charter of the Bank of
England prevented one-third of the directors of the bank from seeking
reelection,99 while the charter of the First Bank of the United States prevented
one-quarter of the directors from seeking reelection.100
In one important respect, however, American charters, including that of
the first Bank of the United States, typically differed from the governance
structure used by the Bank of England. Unlike the common American practice as
embodied in the charter of the first Bank of the United States, the charter of the
Bank of England provided for election of the bank’s president by the court of
proprietors, instead of appointment by the directors.101 In fact, it is somewhat
ironic that American corporate governance has followed a sort of English
parliamentary model under which the board appoints the company’s chief
executive, whereas early English corporations often followed a model closer to
American political practice of having the members directly elect the company’s
chief executive.102 In any event, by the close of the eighteenth century, the Bank
of England’s court of proprietors would simply approve the “house list” of
candidates for directorships prepared by the existing directors103 – thus
establishing the historical roots of the separation of ownership and control.
While, in this regard, the Bank of England’s practice provided an early harbinger
of the divergence of the board-centered governance model from the realities that
prevail in the publicly held corporation, in another way, the Bank of England’s
board followed the model. At its inception, the Bank of England’s board met
weekly to participate in running the bank, and, throughout the bank’s history,
committees of Bank of England directors remained actively involved in the
bank’s management.104
2. The Companies Established to Colonize America
The English corporations chartered to establish colonies in what became
the United States of America probably also influenced early American
corporations to adopt board governance. In this case, however, the influence
would have been subtler, since these companies had passed from the scene by the
time Americans formed business corporations. Still, it is likely that the pattern of
board governance established by these colonizing companies – which continued
to reverberate in the political institutions of the thirteen states – made Americans
comfortable with the notion of corporate governing boards.
In 1606, James I granted a charter to two companies for purposes of trade
and colonization in North America. This charter granted what was earlier
referred to as the London Company, and later became known as the Virginia
Company, the right to plant a colony at any place between the 34th and 41st
parallels, while what was typically referred to as the Plymouth Company could
plant a colony between the 38th and 45th parallels. Each company consisted of
99

5 and 6 William and Mary, c. 20.
Bank Act [S-15] (Feb. 25, 1791) § 7(2).
E.g., O’Donnell, supra note __ at 61.
102
See text accompanying notes __ infra..
103
E.g., O’Donnell, supra note __ at 62-63.
104
Id at 61, 66.
100
101

18

2004/ The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors

certain “knights, gentlemen, merchants and other adventurers” named in the
charter, plus any other persons whom the original members of the company
allowed to join the company. The charter provided for governance through two
types of councils. Each colony would have a local resident council of thirteen
members appointed by the king. At the same time, the king would appoint a
“Council of Virginia” of thirteen members in England for “superior managing
and direction.”105 Notice that, while these companies followed a governance
model based on boards, they did not at this point follow the model of a board
elected by the members of the company.
James I’s attempt to deprive the members of the London Company of the
power to select the council, however, proved unsatisfactory in the aftermath of
the disappointing results from the Jamestown colony. As a result, in 1609, a new
charter was issued for the London Company, now called the “Treasurer and
Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London for the First Colony
of Virginia.” This new charter placed the executive power over the company in
the hands of a treasurer and deputy treasurer,106 and also established a new
governing council in England. Significantly, the company’s council was elected
by the members of the company, rather than appointed by the king.107
Membership in the company, in turn, was available to persons who contributed
money towards the colony.108 Hence, at this point, the London Company had
adopted common features of the board-centered model of corporate governance.
As far as local governance at the colony, the 1609 charter eliminated the local
council and provided for control by a governor appointed by the company’s
council in England.109
Three years later, yet another iteration occurred in the governance
scheme for the London Company. Interestingly, the new charter issued for the
London Company in 1612 represented something of a move away from board
governance, and an additional flow of power directly to the members of the
company. The 1612 charter limited the authority of the council, on its own, to
handling “matters of less consequence and weight as shall from time to time
happen touching and concerning” the colony. To handle “matters and affairs of
greater weight and importance,” such as the manner of government to be used,
the disposition of land and possessions, and the settling and establishing of trade,
the 1612 charter called for quarterly assemblies comprised of the council and
members of the company sitting as one body. These assemblies, which the
charter entitled “The Four Great and General Courts of the Council and Company
of Adventurers of Virginia,” also were empowered to elect members of the
105
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council and officers of the company. At this point, control of the local situation
at the colony lay in the hands of a governor appointed by the assembly.110 In the
end, however, this governance structure contributed to, or at least did not prevent,
the company’s undoing. In 1624, James I obtained the dissolution of the London
Company through a quo warranto proceeding – writers disagree whether this was
because of James’ displeasure with the company’s democratic experimentation,
or a justified frustration with dissension and mismanagement by the company’s
members.111
Meanwhile, back at the Plymouth Company, the company received a
new charter in 1620 under the name “The Council established at Plymouth, in the
County of Devon, for the planting, ordering, and governing of New England, in
America.” As suggested by this name, the membership in the company became
synonymous with membership in the governing council.112 The charter limited
membership to forty members, who were named in the charter and held
memberships for life, and who filled vacancies by vote of the existing members.
Needless to say, this represents a substantial deviation from the model of
governance through a board of representatives elected by the owners of the
company. After an unsuccessful effort to establish a colony at the mouth of the
Kennebec River in 1607, the Plymouth Company largely confined its activities to
granting other groups the license to establish colonies or trade in parts of the
territory to which the Plymouth Company had received the exclusive rights in its
charter.113
While the Plymouth Company itself did little to establish the model of
corporate governance through elected boards, it indirectly played a role in
spreading this model. In 1628, John Winthrop and others secured from the
Plymouth Company a grant of land from a point three miles north of the
Merrimac River to a point three miles south of the Charles River. The next year,
after obtaining confirmation of this grant from Charles I, Winthrop and his
associates obtained a charter to form a corporation named the “Governor and
Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England” (typically referred to as the
Massachusetts Bay Company). The governance scheme set out in the charter of
the Massachusetts Bay Company borrowed from the London Company and
exhibited features of the board-centered model of corporate governance missing
from the Plymouth Company. The charter called for a governor, deputy
governor, and eighteen so-called “assistants.” As we shall see later,114 the term
“assistants” is one of the earliest English designations for what we now would
call directors. The charter named the first governor, deputy governor and
assistants for the Massachusetts Bay Company, but called for the subsequent
election of persons to hold these positions by the members of the company. The
charter called for at least monthly meetings of the governor (or deputy governor)
and assistants to direct the affairs of the company. Copying from the London
110
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Company, the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company also called for four
“great and general courts” attended by the governor or deputy governor, at least
six assistants, and the members of the company, to take place every year. These
general courts had the power to elect officers for the company.115
There was one key difference, however, between the governance
provisions of the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company and the governance
provisions of the charter of the London Company from which the Massachusetts
Bay Company copied. Unlike the London Company’s charter, the charter for the
Massachusetts Bay Company did not specify that the company’s general courts
and council had to meet in England. Accordingly, the members of the
Massachusetts Bay Company – who were using the company structure to further
a religious and political agenda – met in Massachusetts.116 As a result, the
elected governing board of the Massachusetts Bay Company became, in effect,
the Massachusetts colonial legislature.
The corporate charter for the
Massachusetts Bay Company remained the governing constitution for the
Massachusetts colony until 1691, when a new royal charter for the colony
replaced the Massachusetts Bay’s Company’s corporate charter. The 1691
charter, however, preserved the existing governance structure, except that the
king thereafter appointed the colony’s governor.117
The upshot was that the Massachusetts Bay Company had even more
influence on the structure of American government then it did on the governance
of American business. The same is true of the London Company, whose
members, in 1621, adopted an “Ordinance and Constitution” for the government
of Virginia, which, copying from their own charter, called for the governance of
the colony by a governor, council of assistants, and a general assembly at the
colony.118 The governance structure established by the London Company for the
Virginia colony in 1621 provided the model for other colonies in Maryland and
the Carolinas, while the governance structure established by the Massachusetts
Bay Company’s 1628 charter provided the model for other colonies in
Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire.119 In the end, as the American
states began to charter corporations, the notion of an elected board may well have
been comfortable because of its similarity to the governance scheme of the state
legislatures; the irony being that the governance scheme of the state legislatures
stemmed from the board governance of the corporations formed to colonize
North America.
3. The Trading Companies
While both the Bank of England, and the companies established to
colonize America, apparently influenced American acceptance of corporate
board governance, it was the English trading companies that developed board
governance as a model for a business corporation.
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a. The Joint Stock Trading Companies
The charters of the famous English trading companies, such as the East
India Company, the Russia Company, the Eastland Company, the Levant
Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and the South Sea Company, evidence
the consistent use of governing boards.120 For example, at the outset of the
seventeenth century, Queen Elizabeth I granted a charter to 216 knights,
aldermen and merchants to become “a body politic and corporate” by the name
of the “Governor and Company of Merchants of London, trading into the East
Indies.” The result was to create what came to be known as the East India
Company. The East India Company’s charter committed the direction of the
voyages, and the management of all other things belonging to the company, to a
governor121 and twenty-four persons called “committees”. Hence, the title
“committees” (like the title “assistants” encountered in the Massachusetts Bay
Company) predated the title “director” or “trustee” as the label attached to the
elected members of a corporation’s governing board. The charter named Sir
Thomas Smith as the first governor, but provided that the members of the
company annually would elect the committees, who would chose from among
themselves a governor.122
The charter of the East India Company was following well-established
precedent in calling for the use of a governing board. In 1554, Philip and Mary
granted a charter to what came to be known as the “Russia” or “Muscovy”
Company.123 The charter named Sebastian Cabot as governor for life, and
provided for four “sad,124 discreet and honest” members to be consuls,125 and
twenty-four members to be assistants. Members of the Russia Company annually
elected the consuls and assistants.126 Interestingly, while most records were lost
in a fire, the extant records of the Russia Company suggest a familiar deviation
between the role of the board called for in the charter of the Russia Company and
the more limited role the board actually took. For example, the members
(stockholders), acting as a whole, seem to have taken a more extensive role in
managing the company than suggested by the charter (which only empowered the
members to elect the consuls and assistants). Records show that the members at
general meetings selected “factors” (agents) to represent the Company in Russia,
120
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approved contracts and statements of account, and resolved disputed charges of
private trading leveled against servants of the Company. At the opposite
extreme, on many occasions, the governor, perhaps with the input of a few of the
major members, seems to have acted for the company. By contrast, despite
receiving broad powers in the charter, there is little in the records as far as actions
by the board of assistants.127
In 1579, Elizabeth I granted a charter to The “Fellowship of Eastland
Merchants” (commonly referred to as the Eastland Company).128 Under the
charter, the government of the Eastland Company consisted of a governor, one or
more deputy governors, and twenty-four assistants. Members of the Eastland
Company annually elected the governor and deputy governor(s), but, in an
unusual provision, the assistants held office on good behavior.129
The Levant Company started life with a different governance structure.
This company came into official existence in 1581 when Elizabeth I granted a
charter to Sir Edward Osborn, Thomas Smith, Richard Staper and William Garret
to become “The Company of Merchants of the Levant.” The charter named
Osborn as the Company’s first governor, but, with only four initial members, the
charter did not reflect any need for assistants. The charter authorized Osborn and
Staper to admit up to twelve other English subjects into the company, while the
queen retained the right to admit two more into the company. In 1592, Elizabeth
I granted a new charter to the company. This new charter named fifty-three
members, and authorized the company to admit additional members without the
numerical limitations of the old charter.130 With more members, the governance
structure now changed. The new charter called not only for a governor, but also
for the members to elect annually twelve assistants. Growth in the company
produced a new charter in 1605. Admission into the company was now open to
all merchants upon payment of a fee. In terms of governance, the new charter
increased the number of assistants to eighteen.131
English trading companies founded after the East India Company also
had charters calling for governing boards. For example, in 1670, the English
government granted a charter creating the Hudson’s Bay Company – officially
titled “The Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading into
Hudson’s Bay” – for the purpose of trade in what is now Canada. Under the
charter, the proprietors of the company elected annually a governor, deputy
governor, and a board of seven committees.132 In 1711, the infamous South Sea
Company – officially named “Governor and Company of Merchants of Great
Britain Trading to the South Seas and other parts of America, and for
Encouraging the Fishery” – received its charter. The principal business of the
South Sea Company seems to have included equal parts holding British
government debt and encouraging an ill-fated speculation in its own stock (the
127
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so-called South Sea Bubble).133 The South Sea Company had a governor, subgovernor, deputy governor, and a board of thirty directors.134 Sadly, the plea of
ignorance asserted by many of the company’s directors during the investigation
and prosecution following the company’s collapse in 1720135 is eerily reminiscent
of the response of directors to scandals ever since.
These English trading companies not only evidence the use of corporate
governing boards going back almost half a millennia, they played a critical role
in establishing the use of boards as the governance mechanism for the business
corporation. For example, the East India Company appears to have pioneered
various aspects of modern board practice. As discussed earlier in this paper,136 a
key power of the typical modern corporate board – which is especially important
if one views the principal role of the board to be monitoring the performance of
corporate management – is the power to hire and fire the chief executive officer.
The initial charter of the East India Company may have been the first (or at least
the first well documented) corporate charter to grant the power to the governing
board to elect the corporation’s governor, rather than leave this power in the
hands of the company’s members.137 Interestingly, as mentioned above,138
American corporations were quicker to adopt this practice than did other English
corporations. Over the years, various further changes occurred in the governance
of the East India Company, by successive charter or otherwise. For example,
during the eighteenth century, the committees elected a chairman and deputy
chairman to preside over their meetings, thereby establishing an office of chair
separate from that of governor139 – something pushed by reformers of boards
today.140 Another example of governance practices introduced into the East India
Company that remains common today comes from an act of Parliament in 1773.
This act introduced staggered terms to the company’s board of what were by then
referred to as directors, with one-quarter of the directors elected every year.141
The most critical innovation that occurred with these trading companies,
however, did not involve a change in the structure of the governing board.
Instead, it involved what was going on around the board. These companies were
undergoing a metamorphosis from so-called regulated companies – essentially
guilds whose membership consisted of merchants conducting independent
operations under the company’s franchise – into joint stock companies, in which
voting power and economic return came from investing in a common enterprise.
133
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While this evolution did not alter the structure of the governing board, it
fundamentally changed what the board was supposed to do. The board turned
from a regulatory body, which preserved an exclusive franchise on behalf of a
group of merchants who conducted individual businesses, into a supervisory
body, which had overall responsibility for running a business.142
The Eastland Company provides a good example of a regulated
company. The charter of the Eastland Company granted the merchants in the
company the exclusive right among English subjects to trade with Scandinavia
and the Baltic region (but not Russia).143 Such exclusive rights were typical of
the English trading company charters, which attempted to carve up the world into
a series of franchises. So, the charter of the Russia Company granted the
Company exclusive rights as far as English subjects to trade in Russia, as well as
in “lands of infidels” discovered by merchants in the Company.144 The charter of
the Levant Company granted members of this Company exclusive trading rights
with Turkey.145 Perhaps most generous of all, the charter of the East India
Company granted its members exclusive trading rights in a territory described as
encompassing all of Africa, Asia and America from the Cape of Good Hope to
the Straits of Magellan.146
As a regulated company, the Eastland Company did not conduct
operations as a corporation. Instead, the merchants who were the members of the
company conducted trading operations, either individually or in ad hoc
partnerships.147 This fact, in turn, leads to a critical question from the standpoint
of the history of board governance: If a regulated company did not conduct
operations as a corporation, what was the purpose of having a governing board?
The answer is that the board adopted ordinances to govern the activities of the
members of the company.148 For example, the board of the Eastland Company
adopted a prohibition on “colouring” goods.149 Colouring referred to selling
goods of a non-member merchant as a member’s own. By operating in this
fashion as undisclosed principals, non-members attempted to circumvent the
company’s exclusive franchise. As this example illustrates, the role of a board of
a regulated company was not to have overall responsibility for operating a
business, but, rather, to impose rules on individual merchants in order to preserve
a monopoly.
The Russia Company may have been the first joint stock company.150 In
the joint stock company, instead of each merchant trading in his own stock
(merchandise), the merchants subscribed to a fund that financed a combined or
142
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joint stock of merchandise for trading by agents of the company – hence, the title
“joint stock company” from which derives the current label of stockholder.151
There were a couple of motivations for the evolution from the regulated to the
joint stock company. The obvious is the greater need for financing, and greater
risk of failure, as trading voyages went from the close (the Baltic) to the far.
(The members of the Russia Company originally hoped to find a northeast
passage to Asia.152) The joint stock principle raised more money, and spread the
risk among more participants, than did individual operations in the regulated
company.153 There may have been another motivation. Limiting operations to
trading under the company’s direction financed through a joint stock fund could
serve as a way to combat practices such as colouring.154
At its inception, the East India Company seems to have straddled the
worlds of the regulated and the joint stock companies – so much so that
historians disagree over whether the East India Company started as a regulated
company and evolved into a joint stock company, or whether the East India
Company was a joint stock company from the outset.155 The conflict arises from
the fact that the original charter of the East India Company preserved the right of
the members to trade individually under the company’s franchise, much as in a
regulated company, and the fact that not all of the members in the East India
Company subscribed to the early voyages financed on a joint stock basis.156 In
any event, historians agree that during the first half of the seventeenth century, in
lieu of having permanent capital, members of the East India Company subscribed
to joint stock funds that would finance a certain number of trading voyages to
India. These funds then were supposed to be wound up and the proceeds
distributed among the subscribers. In the middle of the seventeenth century, a
combination of accounting confusion caused by this system,157 and the
continuing need to justify its monopoly,158 led to a restructuring in which a
permanent joint stock fund replaced the earlier funds.159 Beyond moving to a
permanent capital, two critical changes occurred in the rights of the members –
historians disagree whether these occurred in the middle or toward the end of the
seventeenth century. Voting rights began to depend upon the amount each
151
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member invested in the permanent joint stock, instead of being available to all
members.160 In addition, the company no longer granted members the right to
trade on their own under the company’s franchise.161 The result of these two
changes was to tie the benefits of membership in the English East India Company
– both in terms of voting control and in terms of any economic return – entirely
to a subscription into a common fund for the company’s activities, and thereby
complete the transformation of the company from a confederation of merchants
into a vehicle for passive investment by the general public.162
The development of the joint stock company, by setting the stage for
transferable ownership interests in which voting power can depend upon the
number of interests purchased and in which voting power might become widely
dispersed among passive investors, obviously has tremendous implications for
corporate governance. It laid the groundwork for the separation of ownership
from control, but also created the ability for today’s hostile takeovers. For
purposes of this paper, however, dealing as we are with the historical and
political origins of corporate board, the development of the joint stock company
has another impact. The same board structure that existed to enact and enforce
rules governing the conduct of independent merchants in the regulated company
(such as the Eastland Company) found itself pressed into service to manage a
large business venture in the joint stock company (such as the Russia and East
India Companies). This occurred without any evident consideration as to the
different nature of these tasks, or whether an institution developed for one task
best fit the needs of the other function.
b. The First English Trading Companies
The use of boards of “assistants” or “committees” by the sixteenth and
seventeenth century English trading companies appears to derive from a pattern
set by two of the earliest companies of English merchants engaged in foreign
trade: The Company of the Merchants of the Staple, and the Company of
Merchant Adventurers. The history of these two organizations is even fuzzier
than is the case with the joint stock and regulated corporations discussed thus far.
For purposes of this paper, however, it is sufficient to focus on several facts
about these two companies. In each case, the company adopted governance by a
160
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board coupled with a chief executive officer. Further, these two companies
apparently were the first companies of English merchants organized for foreign
trade with at least some degree of the sort of exclusive rights from the crown that
would motivate the later English trading companies to seek charters. As such,
the inevitable inference is that the board governance structure adopted by the
Company of the Merchants of the Staple and the Company of Merchant
Adventurers provided the model followed by the later English trading companies
when the later English trading companies drafted charters calling for board
governance.163 The other point worth noting is that neither the Company of the
Merchants of the Staple, nor the Company of Merchant Adventurers, was
anything remotely like a joint stock company. Instead, these were regulated
companies, like the Eastland Company, in which the role of the board was to
enact and enforce rules governing the activities of individual merchants, rather
than manage a business.
Broadly speaking, the Merchants of the Staple engaged in the export of
English raw wool, while the Merchant Adventurers engaged in the export of
English cloth, as well as other English manufactured goods.164 The Merchants of
the Staple take their name from the fixed place (the staple) to which, at various
times, English law limited all sales of raw wool exports.165 The system began
with voluntary efforts at the end of the thirteenth century by Edward I to
encourage all wool exports to go through one market (first at Dordrecht and then
at Antwerp). It appears that the English merchants handling these wool sales
obtained a charter from the duke of Brabant (now part of Belgium) allowing
them to hold assemblies, and, later, to elect a “mayor,” in order to govern the
merchants’ affairs.166 The result seemingly was to establish something of an
organized merchant society or company, but apparently with a simple
governance structure built around an executive officer and decisions by all of the
members. The staple system became compulsory in 1313, with the establishment
of a Mayor and Council of the Merchants of the Staple, who were empowered to
choose a staple town for all wool exports.167 They first choose Saint-Omer (in
Flanders), but tussles over where the constantly moving staple would be, and
who would be allowed to trade, occupied the next half-century. After the
Ordinance of the Staple of 1353 brought the whole thing for a few years to
fifteen English towns (each of which had its own Mayor of the Staple and
supporting officers),168 the staple gravitated toward Calais (which was then under
163
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Merchant Adventurers. Willan, supra note __ at 21.
164
Not surprisingly, this demarcation between the two companies was subject to some dispute,
particularly once a decline in the wool trade motivated members of the Merchants of the Staple to sell cloth.
E.g., Percival Griffiths, A LICENSE TO TRADE: THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CHARTERED
COMPANIES 10 (1974).
165
The interest of the Merchants of the Staple in such a limitation, particularly insofar as it could
reduce competition and allow control over prices, is obvious enough. The English kings saw this as a devise to
extract revenues from the wool merchants. E.g., Eileen Power, THE WOOL TRADE IN ENGLISH
MEDIEVAL HISTORY 87-89 (1941).
166
Id at 95-96.
167
E.g., L.F. Salzman, ENGLISH TRADE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 289-290 (1931).
168
Id at 293.

28

2004/ The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors

English control). As a result, the Merchants of the Staple became the Company
of the Staple of Calais.169 Significantly for purposes of this paper, a council of
twenty-four governed the company in Calais (and, interestingly enough, for the
two years between 1363 and 1365 also governed the town).170 Hence, the
Merchants of the Staple, to some extent as early as 1313, and certainly by 1363,
had adopted a system of board governance.
Despite its somewhat swashbuckling sound, “merchant adventurers” was
a label used by merchants who engaged in the export trade of manufactured
goods. The early history of the merchant adventurers as an organized company is
murky. English merchants trading in Antwerp obtained a pair of charters from
the dukes of Brabant in the thirteenth century, which allowed them to establish a
mayor and a court (an assembly).171 It is unclear, however, whether the
Company of Merchant Adventurers, as it ultimately became known, bore enough
of a relationship to these earlier expatriate English merchants to support the later
company’s efforts to claim this lineage, particularly insofar as the Merchants of
the Staple also laid claim to at least the later of these charters. Early in the
fifteenth century, Henry IV of England granted a charter to English merchant
exporters trading outside England (mostly in the low countries), which allowed
the merchants to elect a governor over themselves.172 The role of the governor
under the charter was to resolve disputes among the English merchants and to aid
the English merchants in their claims against foreign merchants. The governor,
with the assent of the merchants (presumably through an open assembly), also
could establish ordinances for the group and impose reasonable punishments
upon merchants disobeying these ordinances.173 During the fifteenth century,
merchant exporters operating from England, unlike their countrymen operating
abroad, had no formal separate organization. Instead, many of them apparently
were members of the Mercers Company, a London merchant’s guild, where, by
the middle of the century, they seem to have begun meeting as a separate group.
By the late fifteenth century, the London merchant exporters had come to view
themselves as a distinct fellowship with the title “Merchant Adventurers,” and
evidently were operating in connection with the English merchants in the Low
Countries. This is evidenced by a 1485 petition to the English crown, in which
the London merchant exporters designated themselves “Merchant Adventurers,
Citizens of the City of London, into the parts of Holland, Zeeland, Brabant and
Flanders.”174
In 1505, Henry VII took a critical step in bringing together the merchant
adventurers as a coherent company. He granted a charter to The Company of
Merchant Adventurers, giving the Company a monopoly on trade in export of
English manufactures; albeit, membership in the company had to be open to any
169
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English merchant who paid a fee. More significantly for purposes of this paper,
this charter authorized the company (which would be headquartered on the
Continent, rather than in England) to elect “Four and Twenty of the most sadd
[sic] discreet and honest Persons of divers [sic] fellowships” to be “Assistants” to
the governor.175 The function of the governor and the assistants was to resolve
disputes among merchants and to enact ordinances for the regulation of the
members of the company.176 During the first half of the sixteenth century,
merchant adventurers in English cities that perhaps were jealous of the London
merchants’ dominance created their own companies of Merchant Adventurers.
These companies often also employed a board governance structure, with elected
governors and twelve or eighteen assistants.177 In 1564, however, Elizabeth I
issued a new charter to the Merchant Adventurers. This charter confirmed
governance of the company in a governor, his deputy, and, again of most
significance to this paper, twenty-four assistants, to be headquartered abroad, and
who had jurisdiction over merchant adventurers wherever they operated.178
All told, both the Company of Merchant Adventurers and the Company
of the Merchants of the Staple had governing boards whose structure matches,
and evidently provided the model for, the governing boards of trading
companies, such as the Russia, Eastland, and East India, companies. As
suggested by the charter of the Merchant Adventurers, the boards of the
Company of Merchant Adventurers and the Company of the Merchants of the
Staple existed to resolve disputes and to pass ordinances regulating the conduct
of the members.179 The upshot is that the corporate board of directors did not
develop as an institution to manage the business corporation. Rather, it is an
institution the business corporation inherited when the business corporation
evolved out of societies of independent merchants. These earlier merchant
societies or companies, in turn, apparently adopted boards to replace less
structured governance under a combination of officers and decision-making by
assemblies of the entire membership.
C. Continental European Antecedents
While American use of corporate boards evidently traces to English
practice, it would be a mistake to give the English sole credit for developing the
board-centered model of corporate governance that is used around the world.
Rather, it appears that board-centered corporate governance, even in its early
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stages,180 was developing in continental Europe on a roughly parallel track to its
development in England.
One nice example of the parallel development of corporate boards in
England and in continental Europe comes from the East India companies. Two
years after the formation of the English East India Company, the Dutch
government chartered the Dutch (or “United”) East India Company. The charter
(or octroi) of Dutch East India Company provided for governance by a general
council of governors (bewindhebbers).181 This council had sixty members,
broken down into a certain number of representatives from each of the various
“chambers” which had come together to form the Dutch East India Company.
These chambers consisted of smaller groups of merchants in Amsterdam (which
had twenty representatives on the council), Rotterdam and Delft (which had
fourteen representatives), Hoorn and Enkhuizen (which had fourteen
representatives), and Zealand (which had twelve representatives).182 These
merchant groups already had formed shipping companies for trade with the East
Indies, and, at least at the inception of the Dutch East India Company, actually
may have conducted the voyages (while the overall Dutch company, much like
the English regulated companies, served to create a cartel and to present a united
face when dealing with outsiders).183 Evidently, a sixty-member board turned out
to be unwieldy, and so the Dutch East India Company established a second
smaller board (the Collegium) with seventeen members. This board, too, also
had a certain number of representatives from each of the chambers – in this case,
Amsterdam received eight, and Zealand four, and the other four chambers each
received one. The seventeenth position rotated.184
Working backwards, the governance structure of some overseas
communities of Hanseatic merchants displayed a parallel to the board governance
of the Merchant Adventurers and Merchants of the Staple. In medieval Europe,
the term “hanse” referred to associations of traveling merchants frequenting a
foreign country. These merchants banded together for protection, to secure
trading privileges, and to police the trading practices of their fellow merchants.
While there were hanse of various nationalities (such as a Flemish hanse of
London), during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, German merchants had
important hanse in London, Novgorod, Bergen and Bruges. Cooperation,
initially on trade issues, between the towns from which these German merchants
came produced what is known as the Hanseatic League. In London, the
Hanseatic merchants had living quarters and worked in a compound bordering
the Thames, called the Steelyard. The Steelyard hanse elected an alderman and a
committee of twelve (one-third elected by the Rhinelanders, one-third elected by
merchants from Westphalian, Saxon and Wendish towns, and one-third elected
180
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by the Prussians and German Balts) to govern the community. Similarly, an
alderman and a council governed the German merchants in Bergen. The
Hanseatic community in Bruges had a board of six aldermen until 1472; after
which three aldermen, advised by a committee of twelve, administered the hanse.
Like the governors (or mayors) and the boards of the Merchant Adventurers and
Merchants of the Staple, these governing institutions of the Hanseatic merchants
acted to preserve the group’s trade privileges, to enforce rules of trade, and to
adjudicate disputes among the merchants.185
It is important to note, however, that innumerable business organizations
in medieval Europe did not have boards. While this is obvious for sole
proprietorships and small partnerships, even some relatively large-scale business
organizations in continental Europe of the Middle Ages did not have anything
like a board. For example, large Italian mercantile and banking companies, such
as the Peruzzi and Medici companies, lacked a board. Instead, these were
partnerships operated under the domination of a family leader or trusted manager.
The Peruzzi company (which existed from around 1275 to 1343) operated as a
single partnership with branch operations. Partners in the company managed the
major branches (Avignon, Bruges, London, Naples, Palermo and Paris), while
factors (salaried employees) managed lesser branches. All partners residing in
Florence (the company’s home city) had the right to participate in management,
but, as a practical matter, one partner, who gained the confidence of the others,
largely ran the business. For almost a century (from 1397 to 1494) the Medici
conducted banking and manufacturing operations. Instead of operating as one
large partnership, the Medici established the equivalent to a holding company
arrangement in which separate partnerships conducted operations in various
locales, while the main partnership in Florence retained majority control over the
local partnerships. As the family members became distracted with Florentine
politics, a principal administrator (called a ministro) provided overall supervision
from Florence.186 Overall, the development of corporate boards in Continental
Europe is consistent with the English experience: corporate boards developed as
a governance mechanism for merchant societies (like the hanse) or merchant
cartels (like the Dutch East India Company), and only later evolved into the
governance mechanism for large business ventures with passive investors.
IV. THE CONCEPTUAL ORIGINS OF CORPORATE BOARDS
The previous section of this paper looked at when and how corporate
governance through elected boards developed and came to the United States.
This section asks why such a governance scheme originated. In other words,
from what sources did the early corporations get the idea of using elected
governing boards? What purpose was this governance structure supposed to
achieve? Why was this form of governance employed versus other alternatives?
In fact, corporate governance by a representative board, working with a
chief executive officer (a “governor” in the typical parlance of the early corporate
185
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charters), is a reflection of political practices and ideas widespread in Western
Europe in the late middle ages. Specifically, while fictional literature often
pictures medieval Europe as a place of autocratic governance by kings,187
European political ideology and practice in the late middle ages, although hardly
democratic, often called for the use of collective governance by a body of
representatives. Examples of such representative governance ideas and practices
are found in the assemblies or parliaments of medieval European kingdoms, in
town councils, in governing councils for guilds, and in the Church. Given this
prevalent practice, and the ideology that underlay this practice, it was natural for
the early corporations to utilize board governance.
A. Parliamentary Assemblies
1. The Growth of Parliamentary Assemblies
European kingdoms in the late twelfth through fourteenth centuries
widely undertook the development and use of representative assemblies, which
are precursors of today’s parliaments.188 The English Parliament, because of its
survival and ultimate influence, is the most noted example.189 The English
Parliament emerged in the thirteenth century out of several preexisting practices.
Early English kings, like kings elsewhere in Western Europe during the early
middle ages, commonly had councils of advisors.190 Power struggles in the
thirteenth century between the kings and the barons created an impetus toward
broader assemblies with heads of the clergy and the barons.191 During the final
third of the thirteenth century, attendance at English parliaments began to expand
beyond the King’s council, the senior clergy, and the barons, to include
representatives of counties and towns.192 The summonses issued by Edward I to
187
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the so-called Model Parliament of 1295 provide a good example. These
summonses ordered the sheriffs of the counties to cause to be elected to attend
the parliament, with full power to do the business of the parliament, two knights
to represent each county, and two citizens to represent each city and two burghers
to represent each borough within a county.193 Eventually, the knights and the
town representatives began to meet together in a chamber separately from the
barons, thereby establishing what became the House of Commons, while the
barons meeting together became the House of Lords.194
While the English parliament provides the most noted example of the
development of parliamentary institutions in Europe of the middle ages, England
was not the only, or even likely the first, medieval European country to develop a
parliament. Instead, many historians credit several Spanish kingdoms, such as
Leon and Aragon-Catalonia, with establishing the first parliaments, which the
kingdoms called “Cortes.”195 In the end, however, the unification of Spain did
not produce a unification of the Cortes, and the power of the Cortes seems to
have receded following the fifteenth century in the face of the growing authority
of the Spanish monarchy.196
Aragon-Catalonian Cortes spread into Sicily, Sardinia and southern
Italy,197 while, elsewhere in Italy, a variety of parliaments and similar assemblies
came into being, beginning as early as the mid-thirteenth century assemblies
between nobles, clergy and town representatives convened by the Holy Roman
Emperor, Frederick II.198 Ultimately, however, the medieval Italian parliaments
waned in the face the growing authoritarian power of the heads of the city-states,
so that, by the height of the Renaissance, only three Italian parliaments
remained.199
In medieval Germany, parliament-like assemblies occurred both on a
national or imperial level (a Reichstag or diet) and on the level of the
principalities (a Landtage).200 The extent to which the Reichstag, with a few
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historic exceptions, constituted a real parliament is in doubt, however, not
because of too much sovereign control, but, ironically, because of too little. As
the Holy Roman Emperor became increasingly powerless, control shifted to the
local princes and towns acting individually rather then through the Reichstag.201
Hence, the Landtage, which were assemblies of local nobles and town
representatives in a principality, constituted the more significant representative
assemblies in medieval Germany. These assemblies frequently played a role of
arbitrator in resolving dynastic disputes involving either succession to the throne
or partition of territory, and often used the occasion to extract concessions, such
as control over taxes.202
French assemblies with participants from the nobility, the clergy and the
towns became known as the Estates, as they included representatives of the three
estates (or classes) which, under the view of the time, comprised medieval
society.203 As with medieval Germany, medieval France had both national
assemblies, the Estates General,204 and local assemblies, the provincial Estates,
and, like Germany, the local assemblies became the more important. In France,
however, this phenomenon stemmed from the growing power of the monarchy
over the local lords, rather than visa versa. French kings (perhaps fearing the
example set by the growing power of the English parliaments) by and large
declined to call for Estates General, and, instead, sought consent to increased aid
from the provincial Estates.205 At the same time, French nobles did not combine
to force the king to call national assemblies, as had the English barons.206 As a
result, Estates in provinces negotiated over and consented to taxes, and played
what turned into an ever-decreasing role as a constitutional check on the growing
power of the French monarchy.207
2. Parliamentary Assemblies and Corporate Boards
To what extent did these medieval assemblies and parliaments inspire, or
201
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else reflect common thinking with, the earliest corporate boards? One difficulty
with answering this question arises from the fact that historians have engaged in
seemingly endless interpretation, revised thinking and debate as to the nature,
origins and impact of these medieval assemblies and parliaments.208 For
example, while a pioneering historian in the field, William Stubbs, argued that
the essential elements of a parliament, as recognized in late thirteenth century
England, were: (1) the existence of a central or national assembly; (2) that
included representatives of all classes of people (nobility and commons); (3) the
classes being present or having freely elected their representatives; and (4) which
possessed powers of taxation, legislation and general political deliberation,209 the
legal historian, Frederic Maitland, argued that the core of a parliament, as
understood in the thirteenth century, was a session of the king's council, and that
much of the business of a parliament was judicial (hearing petitions and resolving
grievances and the like).210
Historians have propounded various theories as to why parliaments
developed in Europe in the late twelfth through fourteenth centuries. Some
suggest that such assemblies were a natural outgrowth of medieval ideas
concerning the need for consultation and consensus decision-making, which held
that both custom and common law required the king to consult with, and obtain
the acquiescence of, the broader community when making decisions.211 Other
historians emphasize the Roman and Canon Law doctrines of quod omnes tangit
ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be approved by all"), and plena
potestas (the "full power" of a representative to bind a corporate body to
decisions) as providing the legal basis for the development of medieval
parliaments.212 Many historians see fiscal needs providing a critical impetus for
the development of parliaments, as growing demands for revenue increasingly
forced kings to seek consent from assemblies for taxes.213 Yet other historians
argue that parliaments may have been an outgrowth of military assemblies in
which the king sought counsel regarding, and support for, decisions regarding
war.214 The traditional history of the English parliament, as recited earlier,
emphasizes the demands of nobility for consultation as providing an impetus for
the development of parliaments; but other historians argue that parliaments were
a burden imposed by the kings, much like typical attitudes toward a present-day
summons for jury duty.215 A theory often associated with German historians
208
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views medieval parliaments as an outgrowth of medieval corporatism -- not in
the sense of business corporations, but in the sense that medieval society was
organized into various collectives or corporate groups (churches, guilds, towns,
etc.), each one of which possessed various rights and privileges. Under this
theory, medieval parliaments developed as a compromise through which the king
dealt with the representatives of the more powerful corporate groups in society.216
Of course, many of these theories as to the nature, origins and impact of medieval
European parliaments are not mutually inconsistent, but rather, much like the
blind persons' descriptions of the elephant, are simply emphasizing different
aspects of a multi-faceted phenomenon.
Needless to say, there is not the space here to explore all of the varying
theories and debates about medieval European parliaments. Instead, what is
important for purposes of this paper is the extent to which the use of boards in
early business corporations resulted from imitating medieval European
parliaments, or, more likely, whether the underlying ideas that produced
medieval European parliaments also promoted the use of boards in early business
corporations. In the absence of direct evidence of linkage, we must examine the
similarities and differences in practices and concepts between the two
institutions. At first glance, there is an obvious similarity between early
corporate boards and medieval parliaments in that both seemingly involve
collective decision-making by a representative group. Yet, on closer scrutiny, it
is not simple to say whether medieval parliaments embodied all, or even most, of
the underlying concepts discussed earlier in this paper217 which define the boardcentered model of corporate governance; i.e. decision-making by a group of
peers, elected to represent (rather than themselves constituting all of) the owners,
and who have the ultimate authority over the executive officers.
To begin with, the mere assembly of nobles, clergy and town
representatives with the king did not mean that there was collective or peer group
decision-making in the medieval "parliaments." After all, even the most
autocratic medieval monarch might wish to call an assembly of nobles, clergy
and perhaps town representatives in order to announce decisions or as an
audience for major events in the kingdom (coronations or the like). Alternately,
monarchs with absolute authority might seek advice from, and the support of, a
council or a broader assembly, but nevertheless retain power to make the ultimate
decision. Nevertheless, while many medieval assemblies -- even ones to which a
medieval chronicler might attach the label "parliament" or an equivalent term -216
E.g., Emile Lousse, Parlementarisme ou corporatisme? Les origines des assemblees d'etats, 4
Revue Historique de Droit Francais et Etranger 684-706 (1935). Just as there are different theories for the
origins of medieval parliaments, there are also different explanations as to why the English parliament survived
when other medieval European parliaments withered. While some nineteenth century historians attributed the
survival of the English parliament to innate characteristics of the English people (e.g., Stubbs, supra note __ at
1-11), more recent historians find the explanation in a balance of power between the English kings, nobles, and
towns, which prevented the withering of parliaments at the hands of absolute monarchs (as later occurred in
France and Spain) on the one hand, or the fracturing of parliaments as a result of conflicts between overly
powerful local lords and towns (as occurred in Germany and Italy) on the other hand. E.g., Lyon, supra note __
at 157-183. Geography that was not too large (as in France), or too small (as in various city states), also may
have given the English parliament a "Goldilocks" like survival advantage. E.g., Robert Fawtier, Parlement
d'Angleterre et Etats Generaux de France au Moyen Age, in COMPES-RENDUS DE L'ACADEMIE DES
INSCRIPTIONS ET BELLES-LETTRES 276-284 (1953).
217
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no doubt fit within these two possibilities, many medieval parliaments did entail
real collective or peer group decision-making.218 For example, it would not seem
to have made much sense for the English barons to press the king to agree in
Magna Carta to obtain consent of "common counsel" to "aid," (taxes) or to agree
in the Provisions of Oxford to hold three parliaments per year,219 if such
assemblies could only give non-binding advise to the king, but otherwise must
approve or carry out the king's decisions. Other assemblies for which there
seems to be good evidence of real decision-making power include the council of
nobles and town representatives in Brabant (now part of Belgium), which had
control over war, alliances, ducal appointments, legislation and taxes, the
Aragon-Catalan Cortes, which had a veto over new laws, and the Landtage of
some of the German principalities.220 Beyond the evidence of specific practice,
the Roman or Canon Law doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur
(what touches all is to be approved by all) would not seem to be met by a
parliament that had no choice about consenting to the king's decisions.221
Whether the concept of representation embodied in the board-centered
model of corporate governance (that shareholders elect a group of directors,
rather than manage the firm themselves) is anything like the "representative"
nature of medieval parliaments is an even more complex question. The
complexity arises from the different meanings encapsulated within the overall
idea of representation. At its simplest level, both corporate boards and medieval
parliaments are "representative" in the sense that a smaller group makes decisions
binding upon a larger group, instead of having the entire body of shareholders (in
the corporation), or the entire body politic (in the kingdom) make decisions.
Indeed, many historians attach great significance to the Roman or Canon Law
doctrine of plena potestas (the full power of a representative to bind a corporate
body to decisions) in turning feudal assemblies into parliaments. It was through
this doctrine that representatives of the towns bound the towns to the decisions
(particularly regarding taxes) of the parliaments, rather than the king having to
negotiate tax collection or the like with each town.222 On the other hand, the
concept of representation seemingly embodied in plena potestas, as well as
encompassed within the corporatist view of medieval society, was that
individuals represented particular groups -- for example, the burgher represented
the particular town that sent him -- rather than the whole kingdom.223 This is
218

E.g., Antonio Marongiu, MEDIEVAL PARLIAMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 45-67
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See note __ supra.
See notes __ supra.
221
But see Morrall, supra note __ at 65. The fact that many medieval parliaments exercised real
collective decision making authority does not necessarily mean that they operated through formal votes and
majority rule, as would a modern legislature. Instead, medieval political philosophy typically placed a high
value on consensus based decisions. E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 319. Still, this fact might not distinguish
medieval political thought from current board-centered corporate governance, since corporate boards also
typically operate, in practice if not in law, through consensus based decisions. E.g., Manning, supra, note __ at
__. In any event, as remains true both in legislatures and corporate boards today, the theoretical right to refuse
consent does not mean that, as a matter of practical politics, a board or legislative body will say no to a strong or
popular chief executive.
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E.g., Morrall, supra note __ at 64-65.
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different from the representative capacity of the board members of the early
English business corporations, who typically did not represent any particular
group of owners.224 In fact, this difference in the nature of representation
between legislatures (in which members represent particular states or districts)
and corporate boards (at least in the absence of articles creating classified boards)
carries through to the present time.225 Yet another interpretation within the
concept of representation stems from the fact that the modern mind tends to
equate "representation" with democratic election, and, both today, and in the
early business corporations, shareholders generally have elected members of the
board.226 By contrast, despite the romantic views of earlier historians like
Stubbs, town citizens may not have been elected, in any democratic sense, their
representatives to medieval parliaments.227 Indeed, there may have been little
demand for democratic elections at a time when people naturally assumed that
older, wealthier and more powerful members of the community should speak for
the community,228 and when acting as a representative to parliament was a
significant unpaid burden.229 Gradually, more and more residents of the counties
and towns gained the right to vote in the election of representatives to the English
Commons; yet it was to be centuries before such elections typically involved any
choice between competing candidates.230 On the other hand, the lack of
competing candidates remains typical of corporate board elections today.231
The most striking difference between medieval parliaments and
corporate boards, however, may go to relations with the chief executive. While
the corporate board of directors is at least theoretically supreme over the chief
executive, the question of parliaments' supremacy versus the kings' arose in
centuries of European disputes232 (of which the English Civil War constitutes one
shire," and the citizens and burghers sent to parliament are to have such power "for themselves and the
community of cities and boroughs separately," to do the business of parliament. Emphasis added.).
224
Actually, this seems to have been more true in English versus continental European corporations,
as witnessed by a comparison of the English East India Company (which, for most of its history, seems to have
had a board elected at large by all voting members) with the Dutch East India Company -- whose board
consisted of a defined number of representatives for each of the various "chambers" (merchant groups in
different Dutch cities) which made up the company. See text accompanying notes ___ supra. It is also worth
noting that the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers called for the election of persons of
"divers [sic] fellowships." See text accompanying note __ supra. This may suggest an intent that the board
members, even if elected at large, should come from, and thereby represent, different factions or groups within
the Merchant Adventurers.
225
There is some difference in this regard, however, between Anglo-American corporations, and
those German and other continental European corporations that operate under a system of co-determination in
which the supervisory board has representatives of the shareholders and representatives of labor. See note __
supra.
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See text accompanying notes __ supra. Boards of early corporations, however, provide some
noteworthy exceptions to shareholder election of directors. As discussed earlier, the initial charter of the
London and the Plymouth Companies empowered the king to name the members of the governing council,
while "assistants" on the governing board of the Eastland Company retained their positions on good behavior.
See text accompanying notes ___ and ___ , supra.
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dramatic example). Indeed, the relationship of medieval monarch with
parliament (or the equivalent assembly) provided the most visible, but by no
means the only, example of an underlying tension running throughout medieval
political thinking -- this being how to resolve the value medieval society placed
on hierarchy and respect for authority with the value it placed on collective
decision-making.233 Hence, even if a medieval parliament had real collective
decision-making, as opposed to solely advisory, power (for instance to refuse a
request for aid or taxes), this does not mean that such a parliament had the same
ultimate power presently entailed in the board-centered model of corporate
governance. Most especially, there would appear to be a major difference
between the power of the corporate board to select and remove the chief
executive, and the medieval parliaments' general lack of power to do the same
with the king.234 Still, this difference may be less dramatic than one initially
might assume. As discussed earlier,235 the boards in the early corporations
typically lacked the power to select or remove the corporation's governor (whom
typically the members directly elected). Moreover, medieval assemblies
apparently had a say in selecting the king on a number of instances.236 For
example, some historians claim that Anglo-Saxon kings required the consent of
the witan (council of advisors) to choose a successor,237 and, as stated earlier,
German parliaments arbitrated succession disputes between competing claimants
to the throne.
All in all, even though there are important differences between corporate
boards and medieval parliaments, there are enough similarities to suggest a
common conceptual heritage based upon ideas of collective decision-making by
representatives of a broader community. This is well illustrated by the
invocation of the Roman or Canon law doctrines of quod omnes tangit ab
omnibus approbetur (what touches all is to be approved by all) and plena
potestas (the full power of a representative to bind a corporate body) as the legal
basis for medieval European parliaments. Significantly, these two Roman or
Canon law doctrines were by no means solely, or even particularly, applicable to
parliaments and kingdoms. Rather, they originated in very different contexts.
Medieval Canon law jurists and scholars originally developed the doctrine of
quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur from a Roman law technical rule
involving co-tutorship into a rationale for allowing lay representatives to attend
General Councils of the Church,238 while plena potestas originally involved the
power of agents to represent corporations in civil suits.239 The transposition of
these two doctrines into a legal basis for medieval parliaments then occurred
when summonses for attendance at medieval parliaments (which lawyers trained
in Canon law probably drafted) started invoking the two principles in describing
233
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the purpose and nature of the representation commanded.240 Yet, there is no
reason to suppose that doctrines so conveniently transposed into a legal basis for
representative parliaments might not also serve, even without express
restatement, the same function for the boards of early business corporations.
Indeed, the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers grants the
board "full power and authority" to rule and govern over the merchants.241 This
suggests a common legal basis for corporate boards and medieval parliaments,
since both institutions served as vehicles to obtain the consent required by the
doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur through representatives
with full power (plena potestas) to give the consent on behalf of the broader
community.
It is also worth keeping in mind that some of the apparent differences
between medieval parliaments and corporate boards may wane when one
compares medieval parliaments to boards in the early, rather than in today's,
corporations. For example, while the judicial function of medieval parliaments
(for whom, as mentioned above, a significant, if not primary, task was resolving
legal disputes) seems very different from the role of a modern corporate board,
much of the function of the board of the Company of Merchant Adventurers was,
as discussed earlier,242 to resolve mercantile disputes involving members of the
company.
B. Town Councils
Town councils constitute a second example of medieval European
collective decision-making by representative bodies, and, indeed, provide an
example that is highly relevant in searching for the conceptual origins of the
corporate board of directors. There is stronger evidence that the use of governing
boards in the early corporations was either an imitation of town councils, or at
least based upon a common intellectual foundation, than is available to establish
such linkage with medieval parliaments. Moreover, since the creation of
medieval European town councils often constituted a departure from either a
hierarchical governance of the municipality solely by executive officials, at one
extreme, or a sort of direct democratic governance under which all enfranchised
members of the community participated, at the other extreme, understanding the
motivations behind the use of town councils might provide insight into why the
early corporations chose to employ a board structure, rather than leaving a chief
executive in charge or following the partnership style system of all owners
managing the company.
1. The Growth of Town Councils
Across Western Europe during the middle ages, representative town
240
E.g., Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295, supra note __ (reciting the doctrine that
"what touches all is to be approved by all" in setting forth the purpose of the summons, and commanding that
the county and town representatives have "full power" to do the business of the parliament).
241
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242
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councils became a common feature of municipal governance.243 As with
medieval parliaments, the English experience provides a noted example. The
first documented municipal council in medieval English history is found in
Ipswich in the year 1200.244 On May 25, 1200, King John granted a charter to
Ipswich.245 The Ipswich charter empowered the town to elect two bailiffs and
four coroners, who then became the executive officials of the town.246 For our
purposes, however, what is most important is something that was not in the
charter. According to a chronicle apparently made by the town clerk,247 on June
29, 1200, an assembly of the town occurred in the churchyard of St. Mary’s
Tower in order to carry out the election of the bailiffs and coroners as
commanded by the charter. After completing this election, the gathered
townsfolk then decided that “henceforth there should be in the said borough
twelve sworn chief portmen,248 as there are in other free boroughs of England,
and that they should have full power, for themselves and for the whole town, to
govern and maintain the said borough and all its liberties, to render judgments of
the town and also to keep, ordain, and do in the said borough whatever should be
done for the well-being and honor of the said town.”249
While we only have the word of the burgesses of Ipswich for the
assertion that town councils were already the norm among free boroughs of
England in 1200, it was not long before other documented examples of English
town councils appeared.250 The evidence shows that among English free
boroughs after the twelfth century, a town council of twelve or twenty-four
members was the norm.251
243

E.g., Fritz Rorig, THE MEDIEVAL TOWN 26 (1967).
E.g., Heather Swanson, MEDIEVAL BRITISH TOWNS 80 (1999). This is not to suggest that
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E.g., Colin Platt, THE ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TOWN 130 (1976).
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Just as the case with medieval parliaments, England was not the first
medieval European country to have widespread town councils. Rather,
documents show increasing use of such councils already occurring in other
medieval European countries during the century before the events at Ipswich.
Not surprisingly in view of their rapid growth, Italian medieval cities provide
some of the earliest evidence of the use of town councils.252 In the twelfth
century, groups composed of so-called “consuls” -- typically numbering from
four to twelve, or a multiple thereof253-- governed many Italian cities.254 Because
of continued strife between various classes and factions, however, Italian cities,
after a period of increasingly democratic governance during the thirteenth and
early fourteenth centuries, often ended up in the Renaissance governed by
magistrates and princes with dictatorial powers.255
In the north, municipalities in Flanders also provide very early evidence
of the use of town councils; albeit, this apparent precociousness may simply
reflect an accident of greater documentation. A succession dispute in 1127 over
who would become the count of Flanders has left for later historians a written
charter granted to Saint-Omer, the provisions in which might be typical of the
rights of towns in Flanders at the time. In addition to confirming the burgesses of
the town’s exemptions from obligations of feudalism, the Saint-Omer charter,
significantly for our purposes, grants the burgesses the right to be tried by their
own “echevins.”256 While this suggests solely a judicial function for the socalled “echevins,” it appears from later evidence that during the twelfth century
in Flanders the echevins had become a locally elected commission, normally
numbering twelve persons, who handled all of the executive, as well as judicial,
governance functions of the town.257 Such councils with combined judicial and
executive functions -- sometimes called echevins and sometimes called “jures” -can be found governing towns throughout northern France by the middle to late
twelfth century, while in the south of France, similar institutions, but whose
252
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members possessed the Italian influenced name of consuls, were in charge of the
foremost towns by 1150.258 In the end, however, just as the growing autocratic
control by town princes doomed most Italian parliaments and town councils
alike, the growing power of the French monarchy caused a decline in the power
of both the Estates and the French town councils. By the middle of the fifteenth
century, royal officials were taking over control from the consular government of
the town burgesses in France.259
During the twelfth and thirteen centuries, the town council continued to
spread throughout Western Europe.260 The end result was that town councils,
commonly numbering twelve or some multiple thereof, became a prevalent
feature of medieval European municipal government.261
2. Town Councils and Corporate Boards
The earlier comparison of medieval European parliaments and corporate
boards produced some, but admittedly only mixed, evidence of imitation or a
common conceptual underpinning. By contrast, there is much stronger evidence
of such commonality between early corporate boards and medieval European
town councils. To begin with, medieval municipalities were often “corporations”
themselves, and, hence, would have provided a logical template for governance
provisions in the charters of the early trading companies. Actually, medieval
towns were corporations under a couple of different meanings of the term – both
of which, in fact, are significant in suggesting a linkage between town councils
and the early trading company boards.
The definition of a “corporation” that is more familiar to the lawyer is
that it is a fictitious legal entity or person, created by an act of the state, which
possesses rights such as the ability to hold property and to sue and be sued, and
can continue to exist despite the death of its members.262 Many English towns,
starting in the fifteenth century, sought and received charters making them
corporations in this sense.263 The typical explanation for this action given by
historians focuses on certain practical advantages that resulted from such status –
especially, the ability of a town to avoid application of the legislation on
mortmain by becoming a royally chartered corporation empowered to hold
property.264 The same concerns with owning property despite the legislation on
mortmain also inspired a number of English guilds to seek royal grants of
corporate charters at this time.265 Hence, it is entirely plausible that lawyers
258
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drafting charters for towns, guilds, and, later, trading companies, would have
borrowed ideas, including with respect to governance, from the charter of one
type of corporation in order to include in the charter of another type -particularly insofar as one aspect of the trend toward formal town incorporation
was the inclusion in the new charters of governance provisions formalizing and
refining the reliance on town councils.266
There is another meaning of corporation, however, which would have
encompassed more towns, at an earlier stage, and could have had an even more
profound linkage to the governance of early trading companies. This meaning
comes from a sort of realist theory of the corporation often associated with
German legal philosophers.267 Under this approach, a corporation is not some
fictitious legal person created by an act of the state, but rather the law’s
recognition that some groups can engage in such a degree of collective action and
have such a collective identity that the collective itself starts to exist as an
independent reality, and, as such, possesses rights and liabilities. Medieval
corporations in this sense included guilds, universities, the Church or some of its
components, and, of importance here, towns.268 We encountered this notion
before as one explanation of the development of medieval parliaments –
specifically, that such parliaments arose as a mechanism through which
representatives of the more powerful corporations dealt with the monarch.269
While this consequence of the corporate nature of medieval society impacted
political institutions external to the corporations themselves, the corporate nature
of medieval society could also have had an impact on the nature of political or
governing institutions within the corporations. This internal impact, which, if
present, would establish an extraordinarily strong link between town councils and
corporate boards, arises from the possibility that the widespread existence of
corporate collectives in medieval Europe produced overarching ideas about the
governance of corporate collectives, no matter in what context the collective
arose – town, guild, or trading company – and that these overarching ideas
naturally led to the introduction of councils and boards.270 We shall return to the
prospect shortly when considering why medieval European towns developed
councils.
In addition to providing a logical source for governance ideas for the
early trading corporations, medieval town councils had a practical linkage to such
corporations. This linkage comes through the merchant guilds. As discussed
above,271 the early trading companies (as exemplified by the Company of
266
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Merchant Adventurers) were in large measure little more than merchant guilds,
which then morphed into the joint stock companies. Guild leadership, in turn,
substantially overlapped with membership on medieval town councils. Once
again, we can thank the Ipswich chronicler for convenient evidence of this
relationship. The Ipswich charter, like many similar charters, granted the
burgesses the right to have a guild merchant.272 The Ipswich chronicler relates
how, during the course of their organizing assemblies, the Ipswich townsfolk
selected one of the twelve chief portmen to be the alderman (or head) of this
guild, and named three other chief portmen, as well as one of the coroners, to be
the four assistants to the alderman.273 In many instances, the overlap between
town council and the leadership of the merchant guild went beyond common
members. In Cologne, the managing committee of the merchant guild became
the town’s first government,274 while, in Calais, the governing council of the
Merchants of the Staple ran the town for two years.275 Florentine town councils
for some time were composed of representatives selected by the various guilds.276
In many towns, the guildhall served as, and ultimately became, the town hall.277
All told, given the connections between town councils and merchant guilds, and
between merchant guilds and early trading companies, it is difficult to believe
that similarities between town councils and early corporate boards are
coincidental.
Additional evidence that early corporate boards were either imitating
medieval town councils, or were based upon ideas held in common, comes from
the comparing the composition of the two bodies. To begin with, one strikingly
common feature of the medieval town councils, themselves, is the tendency of
such councils to contain twelve, twenty-four, or some other multiple or fraction
of twelve, members. This is not a coincidence. Instead, it appears to derive from
the twelve-person princely court of Charlemagne and his successors – with its six
“scabini” or judgment-finders, four judges who read the law, and two advocates
who protected the church.278 Significantly, twelve, twenty-four, or some multiple
or fraction of twelve, also turns out to be a common number of board members in
the earliest corporations.279 The council of the Company of the Merchants of the
272
E.g., Hilton, supra note __ at 93. Along similar lines, the 1127 charter for Saint-Omer contains
various provisions supporting the town’s guild. E.g., Stephenson, supra note __ at 35. The charter granted to
Gloucester in the same year as Ipswich’s provides an interesting variation. Instead of granting the various
liberties to the town’s burgesses, who are then empowered to have a guild merchant, the Gloucester charter, for
the most part, simply granted the liberties associated with a borough franchise to the “burgesses of Gloucester
of the gild merchant;” i.e. to the members of the guild. E.g., Hilton, supra note __ at 93.
273
Id. Even more dramatically, a comparison of a mid-thirteenth century membership list of the
Leicester town council, with the membership list at the same time of the governing council of Leicester’s
merchant guild (both with twenty-four members), shows that they were composed of virtually the same persons.
Platt, supra note __ at 133. During the sixteenth century, many of the English municipal leaders were closely
identified with the Merchant Adventurers (Clark & Slack, supra note __ at 129), whose charter, as discussed
above, helped establish the use of a board among English trading companies.
274
E.g., Black, supra note __ at 56.
275
See text accompanying note __ supra.
276
E.g., Carstens, supra note __ at 18-22
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E.g., H.C.W. Davis, MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 310 (1924).
278
E.g., Mundy and Riesenberg, supra note __ at 50. It would also not seem to be a coincidence that
there are twelve members traditionally on a jury, and that these medieval town councils often had a judicial
function.
279
Scott, supra note __ at 151.
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Staple in Calais had twenty-four members, while the 1505 charter of the
Company of Merchant Adventurers authorized the election of twenty-four
assistants.280 Twenty-four was also the number of assistants in the Russia
Company, the number of assistants in the Eastland Company, the number of
committees in the East India Company, and the number of directors of the Bank
of England.281 Beyond the similarities in numbers, there is also similarity in the
descriptions of the sort of persons who were to serve on these governing groups.
The earlier discussion of the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant
Adventurers pointed out how this charter called for the election of “the most sadd
[sic] discreet and honest persons.”282 Similar language calling for the more
“discreet,” honest” and “sad” persons was often found in descriptions of
appropriate members for English town councils.283 In addition, the chief
executive of the Company of the Merchants of the Staple was called the
mayor.284
3. The Motivations for Town Councils
Given the strong evidence that early corporate boards were either an
imitation of town councils, or at least must have stemmed from similar ideas
about governance, examining the reasoning behind the use of town councils
could provide an insight into the motivations for the early corporations selecting
governance through boards. Unfortunately, it turns out that the motivations
behind the use of town councils are themselves subject to considerable
uncertainty. The problem is that town councils arose during a period for which
records are scarce.285 What is generally accepted is that early medieval towns
typically were run under a representative of the king,286 a local noble,287 or the
clergy.288 We also know, as detailed above, that towns in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries increasingly had councils. Unfortunately, the evidence is
280

See text accompanying note __ supra.
See text accompanying notes __ supra. The 1593 charter of the Levant Company called for
twelve assistants, while both the 1605 charter of this company and the charter of the Massachusetts Bay
Company called for eighteen (one and one-half times twelve) assistants. See text accompanying notes __ supra.
Even outliers, such as the seven board members of the Hudson’s Bay Company, or the thirteen members of the
“Council of Virginia” originally governing the London Company (See text accompanying notes __ supra), may
simply have come from taking the traditional numbers of twelve or six and adding one extra member to avoid
tie votes.
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See text accompanying note __ supra. Similar language exists in the charter of the Russia
Company. See text accompanying note __ supra. Interestingly, the charter of the Russia Company, in addition
to establishing a board of twenty-four assistants, also called for the election of four "consuls." As discussed
earlier, the title "consul" comes from Italian municipal governments.
283
E.g., Platt, supra note __ at 119 (quoting language which called for the “more honest and
discreet,” the “more discreet and fit,” or the “wiser and sadder” to serve on town councils)[get footnotes to this
source to see if these were from town charters].
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See text accompanying note __ supra.
285
E.g., Thompson, supra note __ at 766.
286
English towns, as mentioned above, commonly had an official called a reeve, who was
responsible to the king for collecting taxes and had the chief voice in the town. E.g., Platt, supra note __ at 132.
Incidentally, when such an official was appointed for a shire, he was known as the shire reeve, or sheriff.
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Medieval nobles commonly exercised control over villages by having jurisdiction in the noble’s
court to hear most all criminal and civil cases involving the inhabitants of villages within the noble’s territory.
E.g., Swanson, supra note __ at 74.
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In Germany, bishops typically were the lord of the town. E.g., Rorig, supra note __ at 19, 22.
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limited as to exactly how and why municipal government traveled from this
beginning point to this end point.
As discussed above, the creation of the Ipswich council gives us an
example for which documentation is relatively complete as compared with other
towns. The Ipswich chronicler mentions three organs of town government: the
officers (the two bailiffs and four coroners); the council of twelve chief portmen;
and the assembly of the town acting as a whole, which elected the officers and
decided to have a council of chief portmen. The existence of these three organs
of town government suggests that the burgesses of Ipswich had, generally
speaking, three evident choices for municipal governance. They could simply
have had the officers (which was all that the charter commanded).289 They could
have had the officers coupled with assemblies of the whole town. Instead, they
choose a third alternative – officers coupled with a town council. Using the
language of corporate or business governance, the burgesses choose governance
by a board, rather than governance solely by managing executives, or a
partnership style scheme of all members of the community participating in
management. The principal reason the Ipswich burgesses gave for making this
choice is that other free boroughs had such councils; but this rationale simply
forces us to ask why other towns had created councils. As illustrated by the
alternatives facing Ipswich, the broad question, in turn, breaks down into two
subsidiary inquires: Why have a council rather than assemblies of the whole
town? And, why have a council rather than having governance solely by
executive officials?
Historians have propounded a number of explanations for towns
choosing a council over assemblies of all of the burgesses. One set of
explanations consists of relatively benign practicality concerns. These include
the lack of interest by all of the burgesses in attending town assemblies,290 the
notion (which is rather elitist) that many of the burgesses lacked the knowledge
or judgment necessary to make quality decisions,291 and the simple logistical
problems entailed in holding meetings with increasing numbers of participants.292
Needless to say, these concerns remain the reasons often still expressed for
centralized versus partnership style management in the modern business
corporation with numerous shareholders.293 Other historians take a less benign
289
At first glance, one might be tempted to equate the four coroners of Ipswich as being something
of a board. Later sources suggest, however, that the purpose of having a number of persons as coroners (or in
similar positions) was not to have group action, as in a board, but rather to allow busy burgesses (who might
need to travel out of town on trade) to rotate who among the four would carry out the responsibilities of the
office. E.g., Swanson, supra note __ at 91.
290
E.g., Lorraine Attreed, THE KING’S TOWNS: IDENTITY AND SURVIVAL IN LATE
MEDIEVAL ENGLISH BOROUGHS 18 (19__). Support for this rationalization comes from some of the
medieval documents establishing town councils, which contain passages that explain such action was necessary
because of poor attendance at assemblies, and that adopt requirements for council members to take an oath that
they will attend meetings. E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 192.
291
E.g., Clark & Slack, supra note __ at 128 (quoting complaints by the magistrates of Gloucester
about the difficulties of dealing in any matter “where the multitude of burgesses have a voice”); Platt, supra
note __ at 119 (quoting complaints directed at assemblies in Leicester and Northampton where “great trouble”
ostensibly resulted “by reason of the multitude of the inhabitants being of little substance and of no discretion,
who exceed in the assemblies the other approved, discreet, and well disposed persons”).
292
E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, p. 112. The fact that smaller towns retained open assemblies
(e.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 196) supports this as a factor.
293
See text accompanying notes __ supra.
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view, finding the use of councils to be a mechanism for oligarchies of wealthier
merchants to freeze lower classes out of power.294
The other question is why the burgesses did not just leave the executive
officials (the bailiffs and coroners) in charge of the town. After all, such an
action both would have avoided the practicality problems with assemblies, and
would have allowed an oligarchy of wealthier burgesses to cut others out of
power. Perhaps the explanation is simply that all the wealthier burgesses, while
desiring to cut the poorer townsfolk out of power, wished to preserve their own
voice in municipal governance. If true, this would be consistent with the notion
that boards (if they have the same motivation as town councils) exist so that
larger shareholders can elect themselves to a position in which they can protect
their interests.295 Yet, if the town councils existed solely to provide a direct voice
for the powerful members of the community, then one might expect the number
on the council to equal the number of persons with both influence and a desire to
have such a voice. In this event, the size of the councils ought to be all sorts of
numbers reflecting the random number of persons of influence in various
communities. Instead, what one finds, as pointed out before, is that town
councils commonly consisted of twelve, or some multiple or fraction of twelve,
members. This use of symbolically significant numbers suggests that town
councils, like medieval parliaments, were a reflection of medieval European
political ideas concerning the need for collective governance by representatives
(even if the representatives are not from the entire town, but only from the
wealthier inhabitants).
One plausible explanation for having a town council, rather than just
executive officials, comes from the tasks assigned to the council. In the middle
of empowering the council to govern and maintain the borough and to do
whatever should be done for the well-being and honor of the town – all quite
undefined – the one specific function assigned the Ipswich council, according to
the chronicler, is to “render judgments” for the town. This parallels the initial
task of the echevins of Saint-Omer, which was to judge cases involving the
294
E.g., Platt, supra note __ at 119-124. See also Reynolds, supra note __ at 191 (stating that until
recently almost all historians had viewed the replacement of assemblies with town councils as a ploy by the
patriciate to entrench its power; but Professor Reynolds rejects this thesis). While such debates over motivations
are typical, and often irresolvable, grist for historical scholarship, an added complication with the establishment
of town councils is that it is often unclear precisely what form of governance the medieval town council
replaced. A traditional, and perhaps romantic, narrative views councils as representing a deviation from earlier
governance in which the towns operated through assemblies of the whole. Id. In a way, the Ipswich chronicle
supports this story, as an assembly of the town created the council, as well as took a variety of other steps to get
the borough organized. Moreover, unless one assumes that the idea of calling an assembly of the town
occurred to the Ipswich burgesses out of thin air, one might imagine that governance through such assemblies
could have been occurring before the town received its charter (at least insofar as the matters addressed by the
assembly did not intrude into topics (taxes) of interest to the reeve or local noble). E.g., Reynolds, supra note
__ at ch. VII p. 6. If one accepts this narrative, then the choice by the burgesses of Ipswich (as well as other
such towns) to shift from governance by officials and open assemblies, to governance by officials and town
councils, presaged the much later decisions by the Merchants of the Staple and the Merchant Adventurers
similarly to shift from having a mayor (for the Merchants of the Staple) or governor (for the Merchant
Adventurers), plus assemblies of the whole membership, to having a mayor or governor, plus a council or a
board of assistants. An alternate narrative, however, views the council as having taken over directly from the
previous control by noble, king or clergy. E.g., Stephenson, supra note __ at 40, 174. Under this view, the
assembly of the town in Ipswich simply would have been an convocation to provide formal acceptance of a
governing council whose existence may well have predated the charter.
295
See text accompanying note __ supra.
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burgesses of the town. As reflected in these two examples, one of the primary
roles of the early town councils was to adjudicate disputes (especially mercantile
disputes).296 Accordingly, an underlying philosophy behind the establishment of
town councils in lieu of governance solely by executive officials was a
preference for collective determinations of contested matters in adjudication.297
This, of course, is still the preference reflected in the continuing right to trial by
jury. To the extent that some of the function of the parliaments in medieval
European kingdoms was adjudication of disputes,298 this philosophy also partially
explains the establishment of such parliaments. To what extent then does this
function pertain to the corporate board of directors? The medieval preference for
adjudicative decisions by a group rather than an individual seems to support
Professor Bainbridge’s rationalization of corporate boards as justified by the
superiority of group decisions in matters of judgment299 – even if medieval
European societies had not formally studied psychology. On the other hand, the
question of whether a group is better able to evaluate evidence presented in an
adjudication (say to determine whether the evidence proves O.J. killed Nicole,
just to give an example) may or may not be the same as whether a group is better
able to evaluate a prospective merger. Yet, the question raised in this paper is
not why current corporations hypothetically might have chosen board governance
if writing on a clean slate divorced from the forces of history and tradition.
Rather, the question is why did the early trading corporations, such as the
Company of Merchant Adventurers, choose this institution, thereby setting the
pattern others followed. In answering this question, it is seems very useful to
keep in mind that a major function of the board of assistants of the Company of
Merchant Adventurers was, like the early town councils, the adjudication of
mercantile disputes.300
The Ipswich chronicle also provides a significant clue as a second
purpose behind establishing a town council. The chronicle states that the council
members are to have full power to act for themselves and the town. We
encountered the concept of full power (plena potestas) before when discussing
medieval European parliaments.301 It went along with the Roman or Canon Law
doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur (what touches all is to be
approved by all). In other words, the reason that representatives to a medieval
parliament, or the members of the Ipswich town council, required full power was
because the law required consent of all members of the community to actions
impacting the community.302 This meant that if town decisions were not going to
be approved in open assemblies, there should be a council composed of
296

E.g., Rorig, supra note __ at 161.
E.g., Reynolds, supra note __ at 23-34. The reintroduction of Roman law in the twelfth century
led to the increasing use of single presiding judges in lieu of adjudication by collective groups, as had been
characteristic of earlier medieval Europe. Resistance to this trend occurred in the preservation of trial by jury in
England, and, significantly for purposes of this paper, in mercantile matters, where assemblies or groups of
merchants continued to try disputes. Id at 51-58.
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representatives with the power to approve such actions.
As with medieval parliaments, the idea of representation by a town
council in medieval Europe differed in some ways from what we often now think
of by representation. For example, as with medieval parliaments, the idea of
representation in the medieval town council did not necessarily equate with
democratic election. Numerous town councils in England and elsewhere were
self-perpetuating (in other words, the existing members selected new members as
vacancies arose).303 Indeed, the Ipswich council itself was elected through a
process in which the bailiffs and coroners selected four persons from each parish,
who, in turn, chose the twelve chief portmen.304 Of course, as discussed earlier in
this paper,305 such self-perpetuation, or selection of board members by officers,
remains the reality, even if not the theory, in the modern widely-held corporation.
The earlier discussion of medieval European parliaments also noted that each
member of the parliament represented and bound the particular corporate group
(such as a town) that sent the representative.306 This is different from the concept
of representation entailed in a corporate board elected at large by all the owners.
Interestingly, the medieval European town councils straddled both concepts of
representation. Members in many medieval town councils were chosen by, and
presumably represented, geographic divisions of the town (wards) or the
particular corporate groups within the town (individual guilds).307 The Ipswich
chronicle, however, describes the chief portmen, although selected from different
parishes, as having full power to represent the entire town, rather than each
representing his individual parish. Since there is no indication that the portmen
(rather than the bailiffs and coroners) were the agents of the town in dealing with
outsiders, the representation by the chief portmen of the entire town is the same
concept as the representation of the entire shareholders by a board elected at
large. All told, whether democratically elected or not, whether representing
different parts of the town or not, the town council was representative insofar as
it existed to fulfill the function of providing consent on behalf of the whole town
when assemblies became impractical.
Significantly, the need for this concept of representation appears to flow
in substantial measure from medieval ideas of collectives as corporations. As
discussed earlier, medieval towns operated in such a fashion and assumed such
an identity that they became a corporate entity (what medieval jurists referred to
as a “universitates”), even before fifteenth century towns in England sought
formal status as a “corporation.”308 Both in popular conception, and in juristic
303
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theory, this existence as a corporate entity carried within it certain norms as to
governance. One norm, which formed a basis for the towns’ claims to selfgovernment, was that the members of a corporative collective were entitled to
make their own rules as to the internal affairs of the collective.309 The other
norm, which is central to the present discussion, is that such collectives made
decisions by common consent, in other words, by the consent of all of the
members of the collective.310 Ideally, this meant unanimous consent of all of the
members of the collective.311 Practicality, however, dictated compromise with
this ideal. Hence, there could be majority rule in case of irreconcilable
disagreement,312 and, critically here, there should be a council of representatives
if open assemblies become impractical.313
This leads the question of what was the origin of these corporate norms,
particularly regarding consent through representation. The political historian,
Anthony Black, traces the medieval European corporate norm of common
consent, if necessary through a council of representatives, to three sources.314
One source consists of Roman ideas of republican rule. Of course, a skeptic
might wonder how much influence of Roman republican writers, such as Cicero,
could have had on medieval thinking, since Rome, itself, had not been a republic
for five hundred years before its fall. Still, especially for Italian cities, Roman
republican sources could have provided a handy reinforcement in support of
those seeking governance through representative councils. Germanic traditions
provide a second possible source. On the tribal level, early German tribes
operated through popular assemblies in which all members had a duty to attend.
As suggested earlier,315 this tradition presumably also played a role in leading to
the medieval parliaments. Another Germanic tradition involved the guilds.
Because the early guilds constituted entirely voluntary associations unable to
coerce dissenting members, they were almost of necessity governed by common
consent. Christian ideas of community, as practiced by Church organizations,
provided a third source for the norm of common consent. We shall look at the
guilds and Church organizations in some detail below.
If town councils incorporate notions of collective decision-making and
representation, do they also embody the supremacy over executive officers called
for under the current board-centered approach to corporate governance?
Medieval European municipalities varied as far as whether the council appointed
town officials, such as the mayor.316 In any event, municipal constitutions calling
encompassed a variety of associations known as collegia (colleges), corpora (bodies) and sodalitates, and
reflected the Roman Law and earlier medieval European tradition that groups, and not just persons, could hold
property and have legal rights. E.g., Conard, supra note __ at § 65.
309
E.g., Black, supra note __ at 25 (citing the medieval jurist, Bartolus, for the proposition that any
universitates can make rules about its own affairs), 52 (applying this proposition to the towns’ claims for self
government). Ironically, while towns might point to their corporate status as universitates in order to justify
their claims to self-government, guilds also could point to their status as universitates in order to claim a right to
regulate their trade in contravention of city laws. Id at 25 (citing the medieval jurist, Baldus).
310
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311
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for the appointment of the mayor or other executive officials by town councils
may have been more a means to cut broader assemblies out of the process than a
means to ensure council control over executive officials.317 Indeed, there seems
to be little evidence that medieval Europeans viewed the role of the town council
in a manner parallel to the current notion that corporate boards exist principally
as a tool to monitor management. Interestingly, for example, the Ipswich
chronicle states that one of the tasks of the four coroners (rather than the chief
portmen) was to superintend the acts of the bailiffs.318 Finally, it is worth noting
that if monitoring town officials against corruption was one of the purposes of
town councils, the evidence suggests that town councils were not very successful
in the undertaking.319 In fact, perhaps the early failures of town councils to
prevent corruption by municipal officials should have been seen as a harbinger of
the perennial failure of corporate boards as a monitoring tool, all the way to
Enron.
C. Guilds
Medieval Europe had numerous fraternal organizations referred to by a
variety of labels, among the most common of which is “guild.”320 Many were
simply social or religious fraternities organized for communal feasting and
drinking and mutual defense and support.321 Of greater relevance here are guilds
with more of an economic focus. Historians typically divide these economically
oriented, or trade, guilds into two types: craft guilds and merchant guilds.322
There is a direct relationship between the governance of medieval
European guilds and of the early trading companies. This is because the early
trading companies, such as the Merchant Adventurers, were in large measure
little more than merchant guilds themselves, which then evolved into the joint
stock companies, all the while continuing the tradition of board governance.
Moreover, working backwards even further, the precedent setting adoption of
board governance by the Company of Merchant Adventurers in its 1505 charter
seems to have been an outgrowth of the Merchant Adventurers’ relationship with
a merchant guild known as the Mercers Company.
The Mercers Company was a guild of London merchants.323 In the mid317
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fourteenth century, an assembly of London merchants adopted a code of rules for
the Mercers Company, which, among other things, provided for the annual
selection of four masters to govern the group. The Mercers received their first
royal charter in 1393. The charter granted the Mercers the corporate attributes of
perpetual existence and the right to hold property.324 The 1393 charter also
empowered the membership to elect annually four wardens to supervise the
company.325 It is unlikely, however, that either the four masters or the four
wardens constituted a board as such. Instead, it is likely that these masters or
wardens functioned as executive officers, with the multiple number allowing a
rotation of responsibilities in order to avoid overburdening merchants busy with
their own business,326 and with significant decisions left for assemblies of the
general membership whenever needed. One reason for reaching this conclusion
is because, in 1463, the Mercers changed their governance structure to introduce
what is clearly a board. Declaring that it was “odious and grievous” to hold
many meetings of the membership, especially “for matters of no great effect,” the
membership of company passed a resolution that called for the election every
year of twelve “sad and discreet” members to be assistants to the wardens.327
The function of the assistants was to make decisions jointly with the wardens that
all members of the guild would follow – in other words, to replace general
assemblies with representative group decision-making.
Two facts establish the connection between the Mercers’ action in 1463
and the board governance provision found four decades later in the charter of the
Merchant Adventurers.328 One is the obvious similarity in the two boards:
Members of both boards had the title of assistants. While the Mercers board
contained twelve members, and the Merchant Adventurers had twenty-four,
twelve or twenty-four, as discussed earlier,329 were the traditional numbers of
members on medieval town councils. Further, in both cases, we see the same
sort of language about the nature of persons to serve (“sad and discreet”). The
second fact is even more telling. As discussed earlier,330 at the time of the 1463
Mercers’ resolution, the London merchants engaged in export of manufactured
goods (merchant adventurers) were a part of the Mercers Company, insofar as
they formed any group at all.331 Hence, in establishing board governance, the
1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers was simply continuing to
use a structure under which the London based merchant adventurers, as part of
COMPANIES OF LONDON AND THEIR GOOD WORKS: A RECORD OF THEIR HISTORY, CHARITY
AND TREASURE 18 (1904).
324
As discussed earlier (see text accompanying note __ supra), the purpose of seeking this charter
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1391, extended to reach towns and guilds that lacked charters expressly empowering property ownership in
perpetuity.
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331
In fact, despite the 1505 charter, the Merchant Adventurers kept their minutes in the same book
with the Mercers’ until 1526. E.g., Cheyney, supra note __ at 166.
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the Mercers, already operated.332
Given that the guilds are the most direct source for the use of boards in
the early trading companies, the question becomes why did the guilds themselves
adopt the use of boards. As suggested by the earlier discussion of medieval town
councils,333 municipal government probably influenced guild government.334
Nevertheless, it would oversimplify the origins of corporate boards to view the
guilds simply as a conduit that imitated town councils, and then, by turning into
the early trading companies, established the pattern for later corporate boards.
This is because, as also mentioned earlier,335 it is possible as well to view the
guilds as one of the sources leading to the medieval European towns’ use of
councils. In other words, guilds and towns were inexorably linked in a
relationship in which ideas and practices traveled both ways, and that, in turn,
reflected a broader set of political ideas and practices also spurring the use of
parliaments in medieval Europe.
To understand the development of boards in the medieval guilds, it helps
to start by asking what sort of decisions and tasks were involved in the
governance of the guilds. Probably the most important decisions were the
admission of new members336 and the adoption of ordinances governing the
members’ conduct.337 Collection and appropriate use of funds from the members
meant that there was a need for financial administration.338 Significantly, guilds
also commonly sought to resolve disputes involving their members, which, in
turn, led the merchant guilds often into performing the role of a sort of mercantile
court.339
In their early years, the guilds made these decisions and carried out these
tasks through a governance structure consisting of a combination of executive
officers and general meetings of all the membership.340 Significant decisions,
including admission of new members and the adoption of ordinances to regulate
the guild, occurred at meetings of all the membership. These meetings, often
332
A somewhat similar connection may exist between the London based Grocers Company, the
Levant Company, and, in turn, the East India Company. The Grocers – which probably began as a guild of
merchants that dealt at wholesale (en gros) (e.g., Ditchfield, supra note __ at 34) – elected a board of six
assistants as early as 1397. E.g., Lujo Brentano, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GILDS AND
THE ORIGINS OF TRADE-UNIONS 62 (1870). The Levant Company appears to have been related to the
Grocers, as evidenced by the Levant Company’s use of the Grocers’ hall for the Levant Company’s meetings
until 1666. E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. II, p. 224. The East India Company, in turn, used the books of the
Levant Company for the East India Company’s initial organizational meetings. Id. Indeed, the origins of the
East India Company in earlier guilds reverberated for many years in the continuation by the East India
Company of various guild traditions, including calling shareholders "brothers" and requiring they take oaths of
membership. E.g., Scott, supra note __ at vol. I, p. 152.
333
See text accompanying notes __ supra.
334
E.g., Black, supra note __ at 58 (craft guilds not infrequently used the pattern of city government
as a model).
335
See text accompanying notes __ supra.
336
E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, pp. 152-153.
337
Such ordinances often addressed personal behavior so as to promote the members’ living a
virtuous life. E.g., Baldwin, supra note __ at 56-57. In the craft and merchant guilds, the ordinances typically
regulated the quality of goods and honesty in dealings. E.g., H.W.C. Davis, supra note __ at 304, 310.
338
Id at 304.
339
E.g., Swanson supra note __ at 77.
340
Along similar lines, medieval European universities, such as at Bologna, Paris and Oxford,
followed a governance model based upon general assemblies of students (the Bologna model) or masters (the
Paris model), who elected officers (rectors and the like). E.g., Lowrie J. Daly, THE MEDIEVAL
UNIVERSITY 1200-1400 30-75 (19__).
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called a “morgensprache” (morning speech), occurred at least annually and often
were accompanied by ceremonies and festivities.341 Commonly, the guild
members at the annual morgensprache elected officers for the guild.342 Among
the tasks of the chief officer(s) of the guild would be presiding over the
morgensprache, caring for the guild’s property, collecting fees due the guild,
enforcement of the guild’s ordinances, and attempting to settle disputes between
members of the guild.343 On the other hand, if the enforcement of an ordinance,
or the resolution of a dispute, required adjudication, then the matter commonly
went before the whole membership at the morgensprache.344
While, at the early stage, the guild governance structure contained
nothing like a board of directors, this early governance structure is nevertheless
significant to the history of the corporate board. To begin with, the early guild
governance structure, consisting of general membership meetings and elected
executive officials, appears to parallel the governance structure of both the
Company of the Merchants of the Staple and the Company of Merchant
Adventurers before these two early trading companies adopted board
governance.345 In other words, these two early trading companies evolved in
their governance in same manner as many guilds evolved in the guilds’
governance. This further evidences the link between the development of board
governance in guilds and its development in the early trading companies.
In addition, the early guild tradition of decisions by general assemblies
made an important contribution to the ultimate development of boards. This is
because, as mentioned earlier when discussing the motivations for the
development of town councils,346 guild practices were one of the sources for the
idea that decisions impacting an entire collective group required the consent of
all in the group. At the earliest time, when guilds were probably more fraternal
organizations for drinking and mutual aid and defense, than for coordinated
economic activity, the principle of unanimous consent may have been the result
of simple practicalities – if someone did not like the decision, they could leave.347
Moreover, the basic notion of a brotherhood, whose members shared festivities
and looked out for each other, seems intuitively more conducive to collective and
consensus based decision-making, than it is to a command-oriented hierarchical
governance.348 Over time, however, what started as simple practicality, or
intuitive notions of brotherhood, became embedded in custom and norm – and
even could influence Canon Law jurists to turn a Roman Law doctrine of quod
omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be approved by all")
341

E.g., Black, supra note __ at 24.
E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, p. 152. Guilds varied in the titles and roles of such officers.
The Ipswich chronicle describes the election of an alderman to head the guild merchant for the town, with four
others to assist. See text accompanying notes __ supra. As discussed above, the Mercers elected four
individuals, at first called masters, and later called wardens, to be the executive officers for the guild. The
Calimala Guild (the guild of the cloth merchants) in Florence had four consuls and a treasurer as its senior
executive officers. E.g., Edgcumbe Staley, THE GUILDS OF FLORENCE 117 (1906).
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E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, 152.
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Id at 153.
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See text accompanying notes __ supra.
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See text accompanying note __ supra.
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In a rough way, this is John Locke’s social contract theory writ small and in a real world context.
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from a technical rule into a broad principle of governance. This, in turn, meant
that when general assemblies became impractical in guilds or towns, some
institution was needed to step in and give consent on behalf of the overall
community. In the case of towns, this institution was the town council. As
suggested by the discussion of the Mercers Company, in the case of the guilds,
this institution was also a council or a board of assistants.
The switch by guilds to using boards occurred gradually across Europe.
In Italy, fourteenth century Florentine guilds provide examples of the use of
complex systems of councils that mirrored the complexity of Florentine city
government.349 Guilds in some German cities had six or eight person councils by
the fourteenth century.350 In England, a merchant guild council of twenty-four
members (who were virtually the same persons who served on the twenty-four
member town council) existed at Leicester in the mid thirteenth century.351
Documents of London’s Grocers Company record the selection in 1397 of six
persons to aid the wardens in the discharge of their duties.352 By and large,
however, the move by the guilds toward the use of boards of assistants occurred
in the fifteenth (as illustrated by the Mercers Company) and sixteenth
centuries.353
As with the development of town councils, there are different theories as
to what prompted the guilds to switch to the use of boards. The Mercers’
resolution suggests that the motive lay in the burden on the members entailed by
holding assemblies for less important matters.354 Yet, this raises the question of
what were these less important matters that produced burdensome meetings.
Since the matters that went before the morgensprache were admission of new
members, adoption of ordinances, election of officers, and adjudication of
disputes, and since admission of new members, adoption of ordinances, and
election of officers generally occurred at the annual morgensprache – which, as
an occasion of festival and ceremony, would take place anyway and presumably
would be well attended – it seems that the principal matters that called for overly
frequent meetings would have been the adjudication of disputes. Hence, it
appears that a primary reason for the board of assistants would have been to hear
disputes. The parallel with the early town councils, such as the Ipswich chief
portmen or the echevins of Saint-Omer, for whom adjudication was a primary
task,355 is obvious. Similarly, adjudication of disputes was a function of the
board of assistants of the Merchant Adventurers.356 In all of these cases, the
common ideology producing boards, which remains reflected in the jury system,
is the desire for collective judgment in adjudications.
349

E.g. Staley, supra note __ at 119 (discussing the two councils in the Calimala guild).
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E.g., Platt, supra note __ at 133.
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See note __ supra.
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The alternate explanation for the development of boards of assistants in
the guilds also finds a parallel in town councils. Many historians contend that the
boards in the guilds, like the town councils, represented an attempt by the
wealthier members to cut other members out of governance.357 However, given
the custom and norm of collective consent, it presumably would not have been
acceptable to place entire control in the guild officers. The solution is the
creation of boards of assistants with, as illustrated by the Mercers’ resolution, a
symbolically significant number of twelve (or a multiple or fraction of twelve)
members, and with agreement by the membership to accept the decisions of the
board.
This just leaves the question of the extent to which the boards in the
guilds served to monitor and control the guild’s officers. Particularly in the
sixteenth century, the boards of assistants of many of the London guilds acquired
the power to appoint officers in lieu of appointment by the membership at the
annual meeting.358 Yet, as suggested by the roughly parallel developments
involving English town councils,359 transfer of the power to elect the guild’s
officers from general assemblies to boards of assistants may have been more an
effort to shut out the general membership, than it was an effort to establish
monitoring by the boards. Also, as with town councils, when the guilds wanted
to delegate monitoring of their officers, they often did this by assigning the task
to a smaller group, rather than to the board of assistants. For example, records of
the London based Grocers guild show the selection of four auditors “to
superintend the accounts and delivery of the wardens.”360 Similarly, monitoring
of the consuls and treasurer (the senior executive officers) of Florence’s Calimala
guild was the function of three “sindacatori” (general inspectors), rather than the
responsibility of either the twelve person general council or the eighteen person
special council of the guild.361
D. Church Councils
No discussion of representative bodies in Europe of the middles ages
would be complete without reference to the councils in various institutions of the
Church. Admittedly, there is not the extensive evidence of linkage between the
Church councils and the boards of the early trading companies that one discovers
when dealing with the councils of towns and guilds. Still, given the central role
of the Church in medieval European life and thought, it would be surprising if no
intellectual commonality existed between Church councils and trading company
boards.
Councils existed on a variety of levels in the western European Church
357
E.g., Brentano, supra note __ at 87-88. Evidence that an oligarchic power grab, rather than
general membership complaints about burdensome meetings, may have been behind the establishment of boards
of assistants includes the eventual replacement of elected boards by self-perpetuating boards (in which existing
board members selected new board members), and protests by members in some of the guilds, such as London’s
Weavers, about the changes. Id.
358
E.g., Davis, supra note __ at vol. I, p. 213.
359
See text accompanying note __ supra.
360
Brentano, supra note __ at 62.
361
Staley, supra note __ at 122.
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during the middle ages. Provincial synods and local church councils met fairly
frequently in some parts of medieval Europe.362 Of more far reaching influence
were the general councils of the Church. From the first ecumenical council
convened at Nicaea in 325, councils occurred among representatives of some or
all of the five patriarchal sees (Constantinople, Rome, Alexandria, Antioch and
Jerusalem). These councils were chiefly concerned with religious doctrine, and
recognition of their pronouncements as authoritative established councils as the
highest authority within the Church on questions of doctrine.363 An important
development in using councils as a tool of governance occurred in the middle of
the eleventh century, when the College of Cardinals obtained the power to elect
the Pope. Originally, cardinals were simply certain Roman clergy who
performed liturgical functions in the great basilicas, but, in the eleventh century,
the College of Cardinals became the Pope's close counselors, and, in 1059,
Nicholas II issued a decree granting the College the power to elect the Pope.364
The immediate motivation for this development was to remove the intervention
of lay officials (such as the Holy Roman Emperor) in the selection of Popes.365
The long-range impact, however, was to advance a model of group selection of a
chief official (as in boards and CEOs). It also inevitably raised the question of
whether the power to elect gave the power to remove.
The implications of the power of the College of Cardinals to elect the
Pope came to roost in the so-called Great Schism. A decision of the College of
Cardinals in 1378 to recant their election of Urban VI, and to elect Clementine
VI instead, led to the embarrassing spectacle of two competing lines of Popes
(one in Avignon and the other in Rome).366 After several earlier efforts failed,
the Council of Constance in 1414 through 1418 resolved the schism with decrees
that appeared to establish the supremacy of councils within the Roman Church.
362

E.g., Antony Black, COUNCIL AND COMMUNE: THE CONCILAR MOVEMENT AND THE
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authority in their executive officials (particularly the general minister at the head of the order) than the
Dominicans, but subjected the officials to reelection at a set term and to removal for cause. E.g., Davis, supra
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Not only did the Council of Constance depose the contenders and arrange for the
election of a new Pope under a procedure designed by the council, it set forth a
decree announcing that, as a legitimately assembled general council, everyone of
whatever standing or office within the Church, including the Pope, was bound to
obey its order eradicating the schism. Moreover, the Council of Constance
promulgated a second decree calling for regular councils.367 Constance turned
out, however, to be the high point for the supremacy of councils within the
Roman Church. After a later council at Basil came to naught, Popes failed to call
regular councils and effectively reduced the decree from Constance claiming
supremacy for councils to cover only the special circumstance of resolving the
Great Schism.368
Despite its ultimately limited impact on the governance of the Church
itself, the Council of Constance remains important because it represented a
culmination of thought and writings concerning the power of councils versus
Popes (and, inferentially, other governing officials). Some of this writing and
thought deals with issues unique to Christianity and the constitution of the
Church.369 Other writing and thought raised issues whose political importance
could transcend Church governance. For example, did election of a governing
official by a group mean that the group also had the power of removal; which, in
turn, raises the question of what is the source of a governing official's
authority.370 More narrowly, recognizing that human fallibility could afflict even
the highest governing officials, medieval scholars explored the grounds and
procedure for removing an errant Pope.371 Given that these considerations of
Church governance occurred as medieval European kingdoms had been
experimenting with the power of parliamentary assemblies versus kings,
historians have debated whether the medieval scholars of Church governance
were drawing upon the political events occurring around them, or whether the
political events were emanating from ideas developed as part of Church
governance under canon law.372
For purposes of this paper what is most important about the ruminations
of scholars in medieval Europe on the powers of Church councils versus Popes
lies in the efforts of these scholars to draw upon medieval ideas of corporation
law -- not in the sense of a business corporation, but, as discussed before, in the
sense of a collective society, including towns, guilds, and the Church. Here, we
encounter the conflict between the authoritarian views of Pope Innocent IV -367
368

E.g., Black, supra note __ at 17-18.
John N. Figgis, POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM GERSON TO GROTIUS: 1414-1625, 53-55

(1907)
369
Such as whether statements attributed to Christ delegated authority to the heirs of Saint Peter (the
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supra note __ at __.
370
Id at 56 (citing the writing of the medieval scholar of canon law, Lurentius, who drew a
distinction between the divine origin of the powers of the offices of Pope or Emperor, and the selection by
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371
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that only a Pope could judge what was heresy. Id at 58-63 (discussing the effort of the medieval scholar of
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who drew upon the concept of the Church as a corporation to argue that the
power of decision rested in the head (i.e. the bishop for the local church, or the
Pope for the overall Church) -- and the views of the noted thirteenth century
scholar of canon law, Cardinal-bishop Henricus de Segusio (Hostiensis), who
argued that power over a corporation resided both in the head and in the
membership.373 Amusingly, some of the debate between proponents of the two
schools of thought wonders off into the metaphor of the corporation as a body.
(Indeed, the word corporation derives from the Roman "corpus" as in body.374)
So, those supporting Innocent IV's position sometimes talk of the power of the
head to rule the body.375 The arguments of Hostiensis, however, were not
metaphorical. Speaking, for example, of the power of a local bishop to alienate
property, Hostiensis noted that this decision could produce a loss from which the
whole of the corporation (the local church) would suffer. Since this action,
therefore, impacted the common welfare, it required the consent of the entire
corporation, not just its head.376 In other words, we are back to the Roman and
Canon Law doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur ("what
touches all is to be approved by all").
The crisis of the Great Schism brought to the fore the role of a
representative group, in other words a council, as the means by which the entire
corporate body could act upon a matter that concerned all. As stated above, long
practice had recognized the authoritative nature of the pronouncements of general
councils of the Church on matters of doctrine. Medieval scholars of canon law
provided a doctrinal explanation for this recognition by stating that action of
general councils provided the "universal consent" necessary to make decisions on
matters touching "the general state of the Church."377 This is reminiscent of the
summonses, discussed earlier,378 which called upon English towns and shires to
send representatives to parliaments with plena potestas ("full power") to consent
to actions of the parliaments, so as to meet the requirement of quod omnes tangit
ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be approved by all").379 Also, as
seen before when dealing with medieval parliaments and town councils, the
concept of representation employed by the proponents of Church councils did not
necessarily entail democratic election. For example, the principal proponents of
conciliar power at Constance -- Zabarella, d'Ailly and Gerson -- asserted that the
power of acting as a council for the whole Church rested upon the bishops.380
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Overall, what emerges from Church councils is additional evidence for
an overarching medieval theory of corporate governance applicable to kingdoms,
the Church, towns and guilds. Under this theory, decisions impacting the entire
corporate collective require consent of the collective. In circumstances in which
an assembly of the entire corporate body is impractical, consent from a group,
who are representative in a symbolic, even if not a democratically elected, sense,
becomes necessary. The early trading companies applied this overarching
ideology in adopting governing boards.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE PURPOSE OF CORPORATE BOARDS
Having traced the historical and political origins of the corporate board
of directors, the question becomes what can this tell us about the purpose of
corporate boards today. In fact, the history of corporate boards provides
conflicting evidence with respect to the purposes claimed by modern scholars for
the board-centered model of corporate governance.
The development of corporate boards, as well as the development of
other representative institutions in the Europe of the middle ages, is consistent
with the notion that the use of boards (like other representative institutions in
medieval Europe), in part, arose out of problems with direct governance by
groups that have large numbers of members (in other words, the central
management rationale). This is nicely illustrated by the example of the Levant
Company, which had no board when the company started with four members, but
received a new charter providing for a board of twelve assistants when the
membership increased.381 Along the same lines, the apparent evolution in some
medieval municipalities from governance involving assemblies of all townsfolk,
to governance by town councils, occurred as medieval towns grew in
population.382 Yet, if practicalities ruled out governance by the general
membership once the organization reached a certain size, this does not explain
why either trading companies, or towns, guilds, kingdoms or institutions of the
Church, would employ a board, council or parliament, rather than an autocratic
governance structure under just executive officials. Indeed, representative
institutions declined, and autocratic rule increased, in kingdoms, towns and the
Church in much of Europe following the Middle Ages.383
The origins of the corporate board also provides some support for
Professor Bainbridge's argument that the reason for boards lies in the superiority
of groups in making decisions involving judgment. As discussed earlier, a
common task for town councils, guild councils, parliaments, and early trading
company boards was the adjudication of disputes.384 This seems to reflect the
notion that groups are more likely to get the correct result in ferreting out truth
than would an individual judge.385 Also, the tradition of consultation and
consensus that formed part of the basis for the development of medieval
381
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parliaments386 seems to have arisen not just out of ideas of consent, but also out
of the feudal obligation of nobles to provide advice to the king.387 Underlying
the obligation to provide advice must be some notion of the superiority of groups
over individuals in making decisions. Nor was the idea that groups might reach
superior decisions over individuals merely implicit in medieval political thinking.
Rather, this concept was a central tenet in the writings of the noted medieval
political philosopher, Marsiglio of Padua. For example, in his work, Defender of
the Peace, Marsiglio argued that the best laws came from the entire collective
(universitas civium) because "when the whole corporation of citizens is directed
towards something with its intellect and sympathy, the truth of that object is
judged more certainly and its common utility weighed more carefully."388 Still,
despite all this being said, it is critical to keep in mind that the proposition that
groups, such as boards, make decisions superior to those made by an individual
leader (with, of course, advice) was a highly contested claim in medieval Europe,
as it remains to the present.389 Indeed, Marsiglio of Padua was condemned as a
heretic, and was not that influential at the time he wrote.390
It is clear that some representative institutions in medieval Europe had
the purpose, at least in part, of mediating between various constituencies, thus
supporting the notion that corporate boards exist in order to mediate between
various corporate claimants.391 Yet, the medieval representative institutions that
had a mediating role, such as the parliaments and some town councils, contained
representatives from various constituencies.392 So, for example, the French
Estates General and provincial Estates take their name from the presence of
representatives of three classes -- nobility, clergy, and burghers -- that made up
medieval society (at least in the view of the time).393 By contrast, solely the
members of the company typically elected trading company boards,394 and there
is no suggestion that such boards represented anyone else. Moreover, the active
role often taken by the general membership in the early corporations -- as seen in
the examples of the Russia Company,395 and the Virginia Company (with its
quarterly meetings of the general membership)396 -- is inconsistent with the
notion that early boards had any power to act as neutral arbiters in order to
protect various stakeholders in the corporate enterprise from the shareholders.
Finally, while shareholders with a larger stake in the venture may well have
ended up on the early boards, the fact that voting in proportion to ownership
arose only later397 suggests that early boards were not primarily vehicles to
ensure that large, albeit non-controlling, shareholders could elect themselves or
386
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their nominees to protect their interests.
Significantly, the rationale for corporate boards most favored by modern
scholars -- that boards exist to monitor management on behalf of passive
investors -- is the rationale that finds the least support in the historical origins of
the corporate board. This is because the board-centered model of corporate
governance did not originate in the joint stock company with its passive
investors. Instead, it was a form of governance that the joint stock company
inherited when it evolved out of the regulated companies, like the Merchant
Adventurers or Merchants of the Staple. In such regulated companies, the
members each conducted their own businesses, and, hence, hardly needed the
protection of a board to monitor the managers running the company. Instead of
having an oversight function, the role of the board in these earliest trading
companies was legislative (passing ordinances to regulate the membership) and
adjudicative (hearing disputes involving the members).398
Of course, the fact that the original boards did not have a monitoring
function on behalf of passive investors does not mean that the board did not
evolve into this primary responsibility as the regulated companies evolved into
the joint stock companies. History and biology are replete with institutions and
organisms that originated with one purpose and then successfully migrated into a
different function. Yet, as discussed at the beginning of this paper, the record of
the board as an institution to monitor management on behalf of passive
shareholders has not been one of unmitigated success.399 Perhaps the historical
origin of the corporate board helps explain why. Specifically, since the board
was not designed originally as a monitoring tool, one should not be totally
surprised if boards turn out not to be all that effective as a means to monitor
management. Moreover, the political origins of the corporate board suggest a
further problem boards faced when they evolved into a tool to monitor
management. Medieval political thinking contained an unresolved tension
between preferences for hierarchical versus collective decision-making.400 Most
especially, as witnessed in the events before and after the Council of Constance,
the issue of whether a representative body could call the Pope, king or other chief
official to account, was highly contested.401 Of course, the legal issue of the
corporate board's power over the CEO is now resolved beyond all doubt in the
board's favor.402 Nevertheless, the norm of deference to the CEO that pervades
corporate board culture renders boards reluctant to assert their supremacy.403
Might it be fair to speculate that at least some of this hesitancy reflects the
awkward melding of hierarchical and representative ideas lingering still from the
medieval political heritage of the corporate board?
While the historical and political origins of the corporate board of
directors provides conflicting evidence regarding the various purposes modern
commentators claim for the board, these origins suggest a critical function which
modern commentators seem to have overlooked. This function is providing
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political legitimacy. The unifying theme behind medieval parliaments, town
councils, guild councils, councils of the Church, and the boards of the trading
companies, is that they provided the means to comply with the "corporate law"
rule that "what touches all shall be consented to by all," in circumstances when
consent by assembly of the entire group was impractical.404 While the rationale
for this rule of consent may have included the notion that wiser decisions result
from consent of the entire group (or at least from a group of representatives), or
that the requirement of consent by all (or the representatives of all) allowed
various constituents to protect their interests, or that the requirement of consent
served as a check on possible misdeeds of the ruler, there also seems to be the
notion that legitimate authority requires consent, regardless of the impact of
consent on the quality of decisions and governance.
Indeed, once we start looking at the role of the board in terms of political
legitimacy, it is possible to identify the achievements of the institution, and the
reasons for its continued existence, despite a rather modest record in terms of
achieving goals of wealth maximization and business efficiency. An irony of the
development of the trading company boards is that this occurred as representative
political institutions were waning in Europe. At the end of the middle ages,
parliamentary assemblies receded in the face of the growing power of monarchs
in Spain and France, and princes in Italy and Germany.405 After Constance,
Papal authority grew triumphant over councils in the Church.406 Town councils
fell in favor of princes in Italian cities, and royal bureaucrats in France.407
Hence, an unheralded achievement of corporate boards may have been to help
preserve medieval traditions of representative institutions at a time when those
institutions were under siege elsewhere. Moreover, not only did the trading
company boards help preserve medieval political ideas of governance involving
representative institutions, the trading companies also spread those ideas into
new political venues. Of particular importance for an American law review
article, it is worth recalling the discussion earlier of role of the Massachusetts
Bay and Virginia companies in transplanting a board governance model into
colonial political institutions.408
It is also possible to recognize the importance of the political legitimacy
provided by the corporate board of directors when one considers the nineteenth
century history of American corporate law. One of the common themes of this
history is the concern of state governments and political leaders about the power
of corporations.409 For example, in contrast to worrying about undercapitalized
corporations, New York's pioneering general incorporation law limited the
maximum amount of capital corporations could raise to $100,000.410 Image, in
this light, the reaction of legislatures asked to enact general incorporation statutes
had the governance model for such entities explicitly provided that unelected,
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unaccountable, managers would have control over this economic power.411
In an era, like the present, in which it is popular to talk of the corporation
as nothing more than a "nexus of contracts,"412 commentators might dismiss a
role for the board in providing political legitimacy, as mistakenly treating
corporations like "little republics."413 Yet, to dismiss the goal of political
legitimacy is to ignore the history of the corporation and of the board of
directors. The question thus becomes have attitudes toward corporations and
corporate boards so changed that the goal of political legitimacy is no longer
relevant. If so, then one might conclude that the corporate board of directors is a
largely useless, if mostly harmless, institution carried on out of inertia (in other
words, the corporate equivalent of tonsils). Indeed, the original draft of this
paper, presented at a corporate law roundtable jointly sponsored by U.C.L.A. and
the University of Southern California, suggested this conclusion. Yet, in
presenting the paper at the roundtable, I found myself viscerally uncomfortable
with this position. In asking myself why, I realized that it is because I am a
product of a culture which includes, among its values, the ideas of consent and
representation that arose in medieval European political institutions and are still
reflected in the corporate board of directors. I confess that, as a shareholder, I
practice rational apathy and trash proxy statements. Yet, I favor proposals (even
broader than that recently floated by Securities Exchange Commission414) to
require corporate proxies include the name of director candidates nominated by
shareholders -- not because I expect any improvement in corporate performance,
but because this is more consistent with democratic ideals.415 What this suggests
is that the reason the board of directors endures is because human beings, even in
the business context, do not divorce their notions of how to run a business from
their broader political and cultural ideas,416 and that the idea of consent through
elected representatives is so ingrained in our culture that shareholders expect it
even if they do not take advantage of it.
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